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Achieving widespread adoption of innovative electricity generation technologies involves 
a complex system of research, development, demonstration, and deployment, with each 
phase then informing future developments. Despite a number of non-regulatory 
programs at the federal level to support this process, the innovation premium—the 
increased cost and technology risk often associated with innovative generation 
technologies—creates hurdles in the state public utility commission (“PUC”) process. 
These state level regulatory hurdles have the potential to frustrate federal energy goals and 
prevent the learning process that is a critical component to technology innovation. This 
Article explores how and why innovative energy technologies face challenges in the PUC 
process, focusing on case studies where PUCs have approved or denied utility proposals 
to deploy high cost, first-generation energy technologies. This Article concludes with an 
outline of possible strategies to address PUC concerns by allocating the innovation 
premium beyond a single utility’s ratepayers.  
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Introduction 
The federal government has long supported development and 
deployment of innovative, cost-effective energy technologies.1 After World 
War II, for example, the application of atomic energy research and 
development to support peacetime economic growth aided the 
commercialization of nuclear power.2 Following the energy crisis of the 
1970s, the federal government expanded its focus beyond fossil fuels and 
atomic energy to include renewable and energy efficiency technologies.3 
Interest in technology innovation has increased in recent years, as 
lawmakers and stakeholders focus on the challenge of mitigating climate 
change and other environmental impacts of the electric power sector. 
Innovative energy technologies also offer the promise of additional 
benefits, including employment for technology developers and installers, 
reduced costs for consumers, improved electricity reliability, and energy 
security. 
While scholars and policymakers have paid considerable attention 
to the role of the federal government in fostering innovation in electricity 
generation technologies,4 there has been far less focus on the important 
1. See generally Fred Sissine, Cong. Research Serv., RS22858, Renewable Energy R&D
Funding History: A Comparison with Funding For Nuclear Energy, Fossil Energy, and Energy 
Efficiency R&D (2011). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. See, e.g., A.D. Sagar & J.P. Holdren, Assessing the Global Energy Innovation System: Some
Key Issues, 30 Energy Pol’y 465, 465–66 (2002); Varun Rai et al., Carbon Capture and Storage at 
Scale: Lessons from the Growth of Analogous Energy Technologies, 38 Energy Pol’y 4089 (2010). See 
generally Peter Folger, Cong. Research Serv., R42496, Carbon Capture and Sequestration: 
Research, Development, and Demonstration at the U.S. Department of Energy (2013); 
Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture & Storage, U.S. Dep’t of Energy & Envtl. Prot. 
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role of state utility regulators in ensuring that the technologies reach the 
marketplace.5 Nascent electricity generation technologies are often more 
expensive than conventional options and may also present significant 
technology risks. These higher costs and increased risks can create 
hurdles in the state public utility commission (“PUC”) process, as 
commissioners compare proposals for installing new technologies against 
the costs and risks associated with conventional options. These hurdles 
can exist even when the federal government provides a sizable level of 
funding to support a project, highlighting the need to better understand 
the intersection of federal technology development goals and the state 
regulatory process.6 
This Article first explores how and why innovative energy 
technologies face hurdles in the PUC process. It then outlines strategies 
for achieving technology deployment that avoid placing the cost and risk 
of that deployment on a single utility’s ratepayers. Parts I through IV 
characterize the challenge that innovative electricity generation 
technologies present to state utility regulators. Part I provides an overview 
of innovation in the electric power sector. Part II discusses federalism in 
the energy innovation context, where the federal government pursues 
technology development through a number of non-regulatory strategies 
such as funding and incentives, while state PUCs play a direct regulatory 
role by approving or denying utilities’ decisions to adopt the technologies. 
Part III describes the state utility regulation process and explains the 
challenges facing innovative technology deployment. Part IV explores 
case studies where PUCs have considered utility proposals to construct 
facilities with expensive, first generation technologies. Finally, Part V 
introduces possible strategies to accelerate innovation within the electricity 
sector and more equitably allocate the “innovation premium”—the added 
cost and risk that implementation of novel technology inherently presents. 
I.  Innovation in the Electric Power Sector 
Energy technology innovation is a broad concept, covering changes 
that (1) reduce the monetary cost of a given energy service, (2) increase 
the quality of the energy service for a given cost, or (3) reduce the 
environmental or political impacts of a given energy service at a cost that 
Agency, Executive Summary: Report of the Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and 
Storage (2010) [hereinafter Carbon Capture and Storage]; Richard G. Newell, Literature Review of 
Recent Trends and Future Prospects for Innovation in Climate Change Mitigation (OECD 
Environment Working Paper, No. 9, 2009), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/218688342302. 
5. A few authors have discussed the important role of state utility regulators. See generally Ken 
Costello, Nat’l Reg. Research Inst., New Technologies: Challenges for State Utility 
Regulators and What They Should Ask (2012); Scott Hempling, Joint Demonstration Projects: 
Options for Regulatory Treatment, 21 Electricity J. 30, 30 (2008). 
6. See infra Part IV.A.2–3. 
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is considered worthwhile.7 There are numerous examples of innovation 
throughout the electricity generation system, from fuel extraction to 
electricity generation, transmission, and end use. For example, the 
combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing to access 
shale gas resources has resulted in a dramatic increase in the domestic 
supply of natural gas, causing prices to drop and many electric utilities to 
undergo a rapid transformation to increase natural gas-fired generation 
in their portfolios.8 Innovations in electricity generation include advances 
in solar energy technologies, offshore wind, coal-fired electricity 
generation facilities with carbon capture and storage (“CCS”), and 
improved efficiencies with new natural gas turbines.9 Advances in smart 
grid technologies are resulting in innovations in the delivery of electricity 
that allow grid operators to manage grid stability and better incorporate 
renewable energy and energy efficiency.10 Smart grid technology 
advancement is also facilitating demand side management to help reduce 
consumer demand and shift load from peak to off-peak times.11 
Improvements in appliance efficiency are also reducing electricity 
demand, regardless of whether these appliances are part of an integrated 
smart grid system.12 Each of these advances can contribute to a reliable 
electricity system that minimizes environmental impacts in a cost-
effective manner. 
Innovations in business practices are also affecting demand for new 
technologies for the electricity sector. In states with restructured 
electricity markets, for example, two major grid operators—the New 
England Independent System Operator (“ISO-NE”) and the PJM 
Interconnection Regional Transmission Organization—conduct auction-
based forward capacity markets, allowing “a wide range of demand-side 
resources to compete with supply-side resources in meeting the resource 
adequacy requirements of the region.”13 Resources eligible to bid in the 
7. Kelly Sims Gallagher et al., Energy-Technology Innovation, 31 Ann. Rev. Envtl. Resources
193, 195 (2006). 
8. Lincoln Pratson et al., Fuel Prices, Emission Standards and Generation Costs for Coal Versus
Natural Gas Power Plants, 47 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 4926, 4926 (2013). 
9. See Carin Hall, GE's Innovative Natural Gas Turbines See Global Popularity, Energy Digital 
(Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.energydigital.com/oil_gas/ges-innovative-natural-gas-turbines-see-global-
popularity; DOE-Sponsored Research Improves Gas Turbine Performance, Dep't of Energy, Office of 
Fossil Energy (June 17, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://energy.gov/fe/articles/doe-sponsored-research-
improves-gas-turbine-performance; Press Release, The Shaw Group, Inc., Shaw and Exelon Join NET 
Power to Develop Next-Generation Power Technology (June 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/06/idUS99091+06-Jun-2012+BW20120606. 
10. Int’l Energy Agency, Technology Roadmap: Smart Grids 1, 6 (2011). 
11. Id. at 5, 24. 
12. See Steve Pacala & Robert Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for
the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 13 Science 968, 970 (2004). 
13. Meg Gottstein & Lisa Schwartz, The Role of Forward Capacity Markets in Increasing
Demand-Side and Other Low-Carbon Resources: Experience and Prospects, Reg. Assistance 
Project 3 (2010). 
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ISO-NE market include: “traditional power generation; intermittent 
generation resources such as wind, solar, and hydro; imports of capacity 
from outside New England; and demand resources, including real-time 
demand response, load management, distributed generation, and energy 
efficiency.”14 
State policies such as renewable energy mandates, energy efficiency 
mandates, and cap-and-trade systems—all relatively recent policy 
developments—can create demand for new energy technologies. Each of 
these examples can provide market incentives for companies to develop 
and deploy new energy technologies that achieve the government 
mandates in a cost-effective manner and meet the demand for reliable 
electricity.15 For example, the North Carolina renewable energy portfolio 
standard requires 0.2% of generation from swine waste by 2020.16 This 
mandate has created an opportunity to test and improve biogas-to-
energy technology and achieve economies of scale such as by centralizing 
energy production from neighboring farms.17 As of early 2014, twenty-
nine states have implemented renewable portfolio standards and twenty 
have implemented energy efficiency portfolio standards—legislative 
mandates requiring that the electricity mix include a specified percentage 
of renewable energy, or that utilities invest a certain amount in energy 
efficiency measures to reduce overall demand.18 Other states have 
identified renewable energy and energy efficiency goals and objectives.19 
Ten states have implemented cap-and-trade systems that require 
electricity generation facilities to purchase a state-issued allowance for 
each ton of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emitted into the atmosphere and 
surrender those allowances to specified government regulators at the end 
of a compliance period. Nine of those states—located in the Northeast 
and Midwest—are participating in a regional market known as the 
14. Cheryl Jenkins et al., Energy Efficiency as a Resource in the ISO New England Forward
Capacity Market, 4 Energy Efficiency 31, 34 (2011). 
15. The effectiveness of the incentive depends on numerous factors, including, inter alia, levels of 
stringency, electricity demand, and technology costs. See generally Caroline Fischer & Louis Preonas, 
Combining Policies for Renewable Energy: Is the Whole Less than the Sum of its Parts?, 4 Int’l Rev. 
Envtl. & Resource Econ., 2010, available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/ 
Fischer_Preonas_IRERE_2010.pdf. 
16. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-133.8(e) (2009). 
17. Darmawon Prasojdo et al., Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Pol’y Solutions, A Spatial-
Economic Optimization Study of Swine Waste-Derived Biogas Infrastructure Design in North 
Carolina 4 (2013). 
18. See Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DSIRE: Database of State Incentives for
Renewables & Efficiency [DSIRE] (Mar. 2013), http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/ 
RPS_map.pdf; Energy Efficiency Resource Standards, DSIRE (Feb. 2013), http://www.dsireusa.org/ 
documents/summarymaps/EERS_map.pdf. 
19. See Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DSIRE (Mar. 2013), http://www.dsireusa.org/
documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf. 
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Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.20 California has implemented its own 
cap-and-trade system, and has formally signed an agreement to link its 
system with Quebec.21 California officials have also indicated a willingness 
to explore additional linkages.22 The impacts of these programs vary 
depending on the stringency of the mandate, the time horizon of the 
policy, and political dynamics that may affect policy certainty. 
This Article explores the critical, and often overlooked, role of state 
public utility commissions in determining whether innovative electricity 
generation technologies reach the marketplace. State PUCs regulate 
monopoly providers of electricity, a service “affected with a public 
interest” to protect the common good23 by ensuring new infrastructure 
investments satisfy public convenience and necessity,24 and by 
establishing just and reasonable rates.25 Thus, the viability of a utility-
scale demonstration project often depends on commission approval. As 
the case studies presented in Part IV of this Article demonstrate, utility 
commissions may facilitate or frustrate utility plans to implement 
innovative technologies, including pre-commercial demonstration 
projects and utility-scale projects relying on early generation 
technologies—both critical aspects of the technology innovation cycle.26 
“Innovation . . . is not complete unless it includes the further steps 
through which the new technologies or improvements attain widespread 
application.”27 
20. These states include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See RGGI, Inc., Reg’l Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/rggi (last visited June 1, 2014). 
21. See Linkage, Cal. Envtl. Prots. Agency Air Resources Bd., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ 
capandtrade/linkage/linkage.htm (last visited June 1, 2014). 
22. See Mary Nichols, California’s Cap-and-Trade Program Has Learned From Europe, Energy 
Biz (July 16, 2013), http://www.energybiz.com/article/13/07/californias-cap-and-trade-program-has-
learned-europe (“Because of the way our linkage process works, any future partners will have that 
same ability to build a program that keeps central focus on those reductions and their needs but built 
around a shared platform that tracks allowances and offsets.”). 
23. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876) (“Property does become clothed with a public
interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. 
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants 
to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, 
to the extent of the interest he has thus created.” (emphasis added)). 
24. See William K. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity:
Developments in the States 1870–1920, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 426, 427 (1979). 
25. See Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 690 
(1923) (“Rates which are not sufficient to yield a reasonable return on the value of the property used at the 
time it is being used to render the service are unjust, unreasonable, and confiscatory, and their enforcement 
deprives the public utility company of its property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
26. Energy technology innovation includes when technologies “are conceived; studied; built,
demonstrated, and refined in environments from the laboratory to the commercial marketplace; and 
propagated into widespread use.” Gallagher et al., supra note 7, at 195. 
27. Id. 
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II. Federalism and the Innovation Process: The Intersection of
Regulatory and Non-Regulatory Strategies 
Technology innovation is a multistage process, often summarized 
into four general phases: research, development, demonstration, and 
deployment.28 Rather than a linear process, progressing chronologically 
from one phase to the next, recent innovation policy scholarship points 
out that moving energy technologies through the innovation system 
depends on an iterative cycle of learning and feedback, with knowledge 
gained during each phase informing subsequent research, development, 
demonstration, and deployment efforts.29 
Experience in the electricity sector and across other areas of the 
economy suggests the cost of relatively new technologies will decrease as 
industry accumulates experience with design, construction, and 
operation.30 A combination of learning-by-researching, learning-by-doing 
(for producers), and learning-by-using (for customers) contributes to 
reduced costs and enhanced performance over time.31 For example, the 
investment costs for flue gas desulfurization technologies, which employ 
similar principles of operation to CCS, “declined by 13% for each 
doubling of capacity worldwide.”32 Empirical studies have similarly 
identified a ten-to-thirty percent decline in cost with each doubling of 
production across a wide range of technologies.33 Learning and 
economies of scale allow technologies that successfully diffuse in markets 
to reach acceptable levels of cost and risk. 
Successfully stewarding an energy-technology concept through these 
phases and achieving wide-scale deployment involves numerous public 
28. President’s Comm. of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., Exec. Office of the President, Powerful
Partnerships: The Federal Role in International Cooperation on Energy Innovation 1–2 (1999) 
(defining the energy innovation process as “energy research, development, demonstration, and 
deployment”). It is possible to identify additional phases necessary for innovation. For example, the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) characterizes this process as a “research and 
development continuum” and identifies six stages: (1) research or proof of concept, (2) development, 
(3) demonstration, (4) verification, (5) commercialization, and (6) diffusion and utilization. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, Environmental Technology Opportunities Portal: Research and Development 
Continuum (July 12, 2012), http://epa.gov/environmentaltechnology/continuum.html. 
29. Kelly Sims Gallagher et al., The Energy Technology Innovation System, 37 Ann. Rev. Envtl.
Resources 137, 140 (2012). In addition, Gallagher and her colleagues replace the deployment phase 
with “market formation and diffusion.” Id. 
30. Tooraj Jamasb, Technical Change Theory and Learning Curves: Patterns of Progress in
Electricity Generation Technologies, 28 Energy J. 51, 64–66 (2007). 
31. See, e.g., Sonia Yeh & Edward S. Rubin, A Centurial History of Technological Change and
Learning Curves for Pulverized Coal-Fired Utility Boilers, 32 Energy 1996, 1996–97 (2007) (describing the 
role of learning-by-doing, research and development, and other factors on cost trends); see also Paul L. 
Joskow & George A. Rozanski, The Effects of Learning by Doing on Nuclear Plant Operating Reliability, 
61 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 161, 161 (1979) (arguing that increases over time in capacity factors of nuclear 
power plants in the United States and around the world are attributable to learning-by-doing). 
32. Keywan Riahi et al., Technological Learning for Carbon Capture and Sequestration
Technologies, 26 Energy Econ. 539, 561 (2004). 
33. David Popp, Innovation and Climate Policy, 2 Ann. Rev. Resource Econ. 275, 283 (2010). 
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and private actors, including a range of regulatory entities at various 
levels of government (federal, regional, state, and local) and among 
entities located on the same governmental plane—such as state 
environmental regulators, state energy offices, and public utility 
commissions at the state level; and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, the Department of Energy, and the Environmental 
Protection Agency at the federal level.34 Much recent scholarship 
examines various approaches to federalism in the energy sector.35 The 
range of energy federalism inquiries typically center on questions of 
jurisdiction,36 exploring the regulatory roles for different levels of 
government,37 whether lawmakers and judges have drawn or interpreted 
those lines correctly,38 and suggesting alternative approaches to better 
achieve a desired policy outcome.39 For example, smart grid technologies 
and expansion of the electricity grid may raise questions about the 
interaction between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”) and state utility commissions.40 Similarly, transportation and 
storage of CO2 emissions captured from power plants may require 
interactions between the FERC, the U.S. Department of Transportation, 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), state environmental 
regulators, state pipeline regulators, and local and state regulators 
overseeing protection of mineral rights.41 
Energy technology innovation requires viewing federalism through 
a different lens, one that recognizes the intersection of regulatory and 
non-regulatory policy approaches implemented at different levels of 
government.42 While Congress and the federal agencies may foster 
34. See generally Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 Md. L.
Rev. 773 (2013). 
35. See, e.g., Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C.
L. Rev. 1283 (2013); Robin Kundis Craig, Hydraulic Fracturing (Fracking), Federalism, and the Water-
Energy Nexus, 49 Idaho L. Rev. 241 (2013); David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the 
Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 431, 460 (2013); Daniel K. Lee & Timothy 
P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support 
State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 Envtl. L. 295 (2013); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. 
Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 Vand. 
L. Rev. 1801 (2012). 
36. See, e.g., Symposium, Transcript of the Federalist Society’s 2012 National Lawyers Convention:
Environmental Law Federalism, and the Energy Revolution: Can State and Federal Regulators Adapt to 
Innovations?, 14 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 575 (2013). 
37. See, e.g., Klass & Wilson, supra note 35. 
38. See, e.g., Lee & Duane, supra note 35. 
39. See, e.g., Spence, supra note 35. 
40. See generally Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 Harv. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2013); Klass & Wilson, supra note 35. 
41. See generally Jonas J. Monast et al., A Cooperative Federalism Framework for CCS
Regulation, 7 Envtl. & Energy L. & Pol’y J. 1 (2012). 
42. The concept of “dynamic” federalism provides a useful framework for evaluating “vertical”
interactions across multiple levels of government, as well as “horizontal” interactions among 
regulatory bodies within the same level of government. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 34. Jody 
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development and deployment of new technologies through pollution 
reduction mandates,43 the primary mechanisms for achieving deployment 
of innovative energy technologies under current federal law involve a 
range of private sector incentives, government research programs, and 
research grants to universities.44 These federal incentives and research 
funding opportunities are aspirational, as they aim to reduce the costs of 
energy technologies but rely on the private sector to adopt them rather 
than create specific compliance obligations to ensure technology 
adoption. They do not, therefore, raise the types of jurisdictional issues 
that are the focus of typical energy federalism inquiries. 
From a constitutional perspective, there is little doubt that the 
federal government could justify a more direct regulatory role in 
deploying electricity generation technologies under the Commerce 
Clause. The electricity grid is regional in nature and electricity produced 
in one state is regularly consumed in another state.45 In fact, the federal 
government already has a direct regulatory role in many aspects of the 
electricity sector. For example, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
of 1978 required electric utilities to purchase electricity from qualifying 
non-utility generators—including renewable and cogeneration facilities 
of eighty megawatts (“MW”) or less—at their avoided cost of 
generation.46 Later, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 called for an electric 
reliability organization to develop and enforce reliability standards for the 
U.S. electricity grid—a role served by the self-regulatory organization 
North American Electric Reliability Corporation.47 The EPA—which 
regulates numerous aspects of power plant operations that affect air 
quality, water quality, and hazardous waste—has promulgated a number 
Freeman proposes another framework—“network federalism”—that similarly offers a constructive 
approach to exploring energy innovation federalism. See Jody Freeman, Network Federalism (Nov. 18, 
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2356380 (“The network analogy best captures three features of how certain 
contemporary governance systems actually work: authority is divided among different levels of 
government, dispersed across institutions at the same level of government, and shared among both 
public and private actors.”). 
43. These mandates may come in the form of specific technology mandates—e.g., requiring
installation of Best Available Control Technology—or through market mechanisms requiring regional 
reductions in pollution but allowing flexibility regarding the location of the pollution reductions—e.g., 
Acid Rain Trading Program and scrubbers. 
44. See, e.g., Science and Innovation, U.S. Dep’t Energy, http://energy.gov/science-innovation
(last visited June 1, 2014). 
45. The continental United States electricity grid consists of three large regions: the Eastern
Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas. See 
NERC Interconnections, Nat’l Elec. Reliability Council, http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/ 
keyplayers/Documents/NERC_Interconnections_Color_072512.jpg (last visited June 1, 2014). Within 
the Eastern and Western Interconnections, there are also a number of regional electric power markets. 
See Electric Power Markets: National Overview, Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n (Feb. 4, 2014), 
http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/overview.asp. 
46. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2012). 
47. Id. § 824a-2. 
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of rules affecting the power sector, and is considering additional 
regulations governing coal ash48 and CO2.
49 In April 2013, the EPA 
announced a New Source Performance Standard that, if enacted as 
proposed, will require any new coal-fired power plant to install carbon 
capture technologies.50 Congress has also considered legislative proposals 
to create a nationwide cap-and-trade system for CO2 emissions
51 and a 
federal renewable portfolio standard,52 with the goal of stimulating 
development and adoption of new energy technologies.53 
Nonetheless, Congress and federal agencies have consistently upheld 
the traditional role of the states in governing intrastate electricity 
generation and transmission54 and rates charged to consumers.55 As long as 
policymakers maintain the current framework, it is important to 
recognize the relationship between non-regulatory programs to develop 
energy technologies and the direct role of PUCs in influencing whether 
electric utilities deploy the technologies. This Article contributes to the 
understanding of energy innovation federalism by exploring the role of 
PUCs in the innovation process and offers a framework for addressing 
barriers that may frustrate commercialization of promising energy 
technologies. 
A. Federal Efforts to Foster Energy Innovation 
Federal investment in innovative electricity generation technology 
dates to the late 1940s, when President Eisenhower embarked on a 
landmark effort to commercialize nuclear energy.56 In response to the 
energy crises of the 1970s, efforts to accelerate energy technology 
innovation expanded to include renewable and advanced fossil fuel 
technologies.57 Current U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) programs 
48. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Special
Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128 (June 21, 
2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 261, 264, 265, 268,  
271, 302). 
49. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (Apr. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
50. Id. 
51. See, e.g., America Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009); 
America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007). 
52. See, e.g., American Renewable Energy and Efficiency Act, H.R. 5967, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2012). 
53. See, e.g., S. 1567, 110th Cong. § 1(a) (2007) (establishing preference in allocating funds under
the program to “state programs to stimulate or enhance innovative renewable energy technologies”). 
54. See Jones, supra note 24. 
55. Gary D. Allison, Judging the Prudence of Constructing Nuclear Power Plants: A Report to the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 15 Tulsa L.J. 262, 264 (1979) (observing that PUCs can 
influence nuclear power plant development through their authority to protect consumers from bearing 
the cost of imprudent investments). 
56. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Direct Federal Financial Interventions and
Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2010, at 33 (2011). 
57. See Sissine, supra note 1, at 2. 
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seek to reduce the cost of carbon capture,58 enable the grid to handle 
more intermittent renewable electricity,59and develop and deploy 
offshore wind technology in the United States.60 Each of these programs 
aims to reduce cost to improve competitiveness and increase adoption.61 
The DOE implements research, development, and deployment 
(“RD&D”) programs through a host of research grants and private 
sector incentives including grants and loan guarantees. The DOE’s 
Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (“ARPA-E”) provides 
funding and technical assistance to companies seeking to commercialize 
“transformational” energy technologies.62 The Loan Programs Office 
offers loan guarantees to reduce investment risk for companies 
developing or installing certain categories of new technologies.63 These 
non-regulatory efforts may run headlong into the PUC process 
especially, although not exclusively, in states that maintain the traditional 
“cost of service” regulatory model that seeks to protect consumers from 
the monopoly power of vertically-integrated electric utilities.64 
B. The PUC Role in Energy Innovation 
A public utility is a private business that provides a public service, 
such as the production and distribution of electricity, and is subject to 
public restraints on its commercial activities, such as the production and 
distribution of electric power.65 The “regulatory compact” established 
between the public utility and the state grants the utility an exclusive 
service territory, and in exchange, obligates the company to provide 
adequate service at reasonable rates to all consumers within its territory.66 
58. See Carbon Capture R&D, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, http://energy.gov/fe/science-
innovation/carbon-capture-and-storage-research/carbon-capture-rd (last visited June 1, 2014). 
59. See SunShot Initiative High Penetration Solar Portal: Power Electronics, U.S. Dep’t Energy,
https://solarhighpen.energy.gov/topics/system_technologies/power_electronics (last visited June 1, 2014). 
60. See Offshore Wind Research and Development, U.S. Dep’t of Energy,
http://energy.gov/eere/wind/offshore-wind-research-and-development (last visited June 1, 2014) 
[hereinafter U.S. DOE, Offshore Wind]. 
61. See Carbon Capture R&D, supra note 58 (stating the program goal of achieving costs below
$40 per ton for second generation technology and below $10 per ton for transformational technology); 
SunShot Initiative, supra note 59 (describing the goal to make solar cost-competitive by the end of the 
decade); Offshore Wind, supra note 60 (describing the program’s goal to “overcome key barriers to 
wind development, including the relatively high cost of energy”). 
62. Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy: About, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, http://arpa-
e.energy.gov/?q=arpa-e-site-page/about (last visited June 1, 2014).  
63. Loan Programs Office: Our Mission, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, http://lpo.energy.gov/about/our-
mission (last visited June 1, 2014). 
64. See infra Part III.B. 
65. See Jones, supra note 24, at 426. 
66. See, e.g., Raymond Jackson, Regulation and Electric Utility Rate Levels, 45 Land Econ. 372, 
373 (1969). 
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Under this system, also known as cost of service regulation,67 utilities may 
recover all “prudent” costs and a reasonable rate of return on invested 
capital from ratepayers within a utility’s service area subject to 
commission approval.68 Rates must be “just and reasonable,” and not 
confiscatory, which requires PUCs to balance consumer protection goals 
and the utility’s right to the opportunity to earn a fair return on its 
investment.69 
In states that retain a traditional model of electricity regulation, 
state PUCs oversee the activities of vertically integrated utilities 
regarding electricity generation, transmission, and distribution.70 New 
generation facilities typically require a Certificate of Public Convenience 
and Necessity (“CPCN”), wherein the PUC must determine that there is 
a need for the additional capacity and construction of the proposed 
facility satisfies the public interest.71 Additionally, PUCs set utility rates 
to allow a reasonable return on prudently invested capital, which 
discourages utilities from incurring expenses that are likely to be found 
imprudent and unrecoverable.72 
In restructured states, lawmakers have replaced traditional regulation 
of vertically integrated electric utilities with wholesale markets for 
electricity generation in which electricity generators sell power 
competitively.73 In these states, regulators oversee electric distribution 
companies, including investments in new distribution technology, such as 
smart grid.74 The challenge of implementing innovative generation 
technologies in restructured states is primarily driven by market forces. 
Merchant developers may be unable to recoup the high costs of 
innovative technologies by selling into wholesale markets where they 
face competition from generators using conventional technologies. In 
practice, early applications of generation technologies in restructured 
67. See, e.g., Karl McDermott, Edison Elec. Inst., Cost of Service Regulation in the
Investor-Owned Electric Utility Industry: A History of Adaptation (June 2012). 
68. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 66; see also Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States,
304 U.S. 470, 475 (1938) (defining the fair value of utility assets for ratemaking purposes as based on 
whether the assets are used and useful); Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of 
Mo., 262 U.S. 276, 289 n.1 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (explaining the prudence standard excludes 
from rate base dishonest or obviously wasteful or imprudent expenditures). 
69. See Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S.
679, 690 (1923). 
70. Paul L. Joskow, Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity
Sector, 11 J. Econ. Persp. 119, 121 (1997). 
71. See generally Jones, supra note 24, at 427. 
72. Richard D. Gary & Edgar M. Roach, Jr., The Proper Regulatory Treatment of Investment in
Cancelled Utility Plants, 13 Hofstra L. Rev. 469, 470–71 (1985) (citing W. Ohio Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n, 294 U.S. 63, 72 (1935)). 
73. Peter Fox-Penner & Heidi Bishop, Mission, Structure, and Governance in Future Electric
Markets: Some Observations, 89 Or. L. Rev. 1107, 1108 (2011). 
74. See id. at 1110; see also Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., Order No. 83410, Case No. 9208, Balt.
Gas & Elec. Co. (June 21, 2010) (order). 
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states often require long-term power purchase agreements for above-
market energy prices between project developers and distribution 
utilities—subject to PUC approval—in order to obtain financing.75 A 
number of restructured states have enacted legislation that directs 
distribution utilities to solicit proposals for renewable energy projects 
and enter into power purchase agreements subject to PUC approval,76 
and utilities have brought proposals for innovative projects before state 
regulators under these directives.77 
Demonstration and early deployment are both particularly important 
elements of the innovation cycle described above, and progress at these 
phases often requires approval by state PUCs. Demonstration projects 
contribute to learning and technology development in a number of ways78 
and also assist in scaling up technology in cases where laboratory tests are 
much smaller than potential real-world applications, such as for power 
plants.79 For example, demonstration projects “generate information 
about the design of components at commercial scale, process reliability 
and risk of production failure.”80 Technical and economic performance 
data can then inform additional research and development to refine 
technology.81 Demonstration projects also produce information on 
profitability of the technology and can reduce marketing hurdles by 
demonstrating the feasibility of technology to potential buyers, which 
enhances confidence and contributes to future market development.82 
Even after technology has been adequately demonstrated at scale, 
barriers may continue to frustrate early deployment. For example, cost, 
information, market organization, infrastructure, regulations, or slow 
75. See, e.g., Mass. Dep’t Pub. Util., D.P.U. 10-54, 48–51, Mass. Elec. Co. & Nantucket Elec.
Co. (Nov. 22, 2010) (petition) (“The evidence demonstrates that a project like Cape Wind would face 
difficulty attracting financing without a predictable source of revenues with a creditworthy entity . . . . 
[T]he [power purchase agreement] will help overcome obstacles to Cape Wind obtaining financing.”). 
76. See, e.g., Long Term Contracting Standard for Renewable Energy, R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-26.1
(2006); An Act To Implement the Recommendations of the Governor’s Ocean Energy Task Force, 
Me. Pub. L. ch. 615 (2010); Green Communities Act, 2008 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 169, § 83 (West); 
220 Mass. Code Regs. §§ 17.03(1)–(2) (2008). 
77. See, e.g., R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4111, Review of Proposed Town of New
Shoreham Project (Apr. 2, 2010) (report and order); Mass. Dep’t Pub. Util., D.P.U. 10-54, 48–51, 
Mass. Elec. Co. & Nantucket Elec. Co. (Nov. 22, 2010). 
78. See generally Ambuj Sagar & Kelly Sims Gallagher, Energy Technology Demonstration &
Deployment (Belfer Ctr. for Sci. & Int’l Affairs, 2004), available at http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/ 
publication/2596/energy_technology_demonstration_and_deployment.html. 
79. See id.; see also Paul Harborne & Chris Hendry, Pathways to Commercial Wind Power in the
US, Europe and Japan: The Role of Demonstration Projects and Field Trials in the Innovation Process, 
37 Energy Pol’y 3580, 3580 (2009) (describing how demonstration and field trials provided feedback 
to basic research and development that helped Danish firms capture the market for wind turbines 
which had been dominated by U.S. firms in the early 1980s). 
80. Stephen R. Lefevre, Using Demonstration Projects to Advance Innovation in Energy, 44 Pub. 
Admin. Rev. 483, 487 (1984). 
81. See Sagar & Ghallager, supra note 78, at 3. 
82. See Lefevre, supra note 80, at 487. 
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capital stock turnover can hinder market diffusion.83 These factors are 
persistent barriers to the commercialization of new electricity generation 
technology because the electricity sector is characterized by slow capital 
stock turnover and utility regulators seek the least-cost resources to meet 
electricity demand. 
In the energy sector, companies infrequently pursue demonstration 
projects independently because long time horizons for investment 
returns and high capital requirements make it difficult to monetize 
benefits on an acceptable timeline for investors. Government-funded 
demonstration programs, therefore, are designed to facilitate the 
demonstration and early deployment of innovative energy technologies.84 
Because these demonstration programs frequently require participating 
companies to take on a portion of the cost and risk, electricity generators 
often must seek approval from a PUC. Commissioners must then assess 
the additional costs and technology risks associated with the project to 
ensure that cost recovery is consistent with state-level consumer protection 
goals.85 If the costs and risks are deemed too high, the PUC may prohibit 
a utility from passing project costs to ratepayers, thereby denying an 
opportunity for the companies involved, or perhaps the electricity sector 
as a whole, to learn from the project and improve upon the technologies. 
III. State Regulatory Hurdles to Implementation of Innovative
Generation Technologies 
PUCs can provide the certainty necessary to demonstrate and 
deploy new technologies through approval of utility-owned projects, 
long-term power purchase agreements, and inclusion of above-market 
costs in electricity rates. PUC approval and cost recovery through rates 
can remove investment risk for shareholders, effectively shifting the risk 
to ratepayers. However, PUCs have historically emphasized cost 
minimization, posing a challenge for large-scale demonstration projects, 
which are characterized by high short-term costs and diffuse long-term 
benefits. Furthermore, innovative generation technologies introduce 
unique financial and technological risks that complicate the public 
interest inquiry. 
In accordance with the just and reasonable standard of ratemaking86 
and the broad public interest duties of PUCs,87 commissions have sought 
the lowest possible cost of service for consumers within a set of 
83. See Sagar & Ghallager, supra note 78, at 4–8. 
84. See Harborne & Hendry, supra note 79, at 3585. 
85. See infra Part III. 
86. See Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 679, 683
(1923). 
87. See Ford P. Hall, Certificates of Convenience and Necessity, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 107, 108 (1929) 
(“Statutes of this kind have several purposes, but that most emphasized by courts and commissions is 
the purpose of protecting the consuming public.”). 
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constraints—such as reliability, financial health of the utility, and 
renewable energy mandates.88 It is challenging for early applications of 
innovative technologies to strictly meet the least cost standard, especially 
in the current era of large capital investment needs, declining sales 
growth, and the resulting upward pressure on electricity rates.89 
Early applications of new technology are generally expensive 
relative to mature technologies that have benefited from learning and 
economies of scale.90 For example, the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration projects that the levelized cost of energy for advanced 
coal with CCS is $70 per megawatt-hour (“MWh”) higher than for 
natural gas combined cycle, as shown in Table 1, infra. Thus, it is difficult 
for state utility regulators to approve implementation of new 
technologies unless they believe the relative costs of various technology 
options is likely to shift during the operational life of the new facility, for 
example due to fuel price volatility or future environmental regulations.91 
88. See generally Shimon Awerbuch, Portfolio-Based Electricity Generation Planning: Policy
Implication for Renewables and Energy Security, 11 Mitigation & Adaptation Strategies for Global 
Change 693 (2006) (“[L]east-cost planning has provided the basis for electricity generation capacity 
expansion.”); see also Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 2009-00545, Ky. Power Co., at 5 (June 28, 2010) 
(“The Commission has long recognized that ‘least cost’ is one of the fundamental principles used when 
setting rates that are fair, just, and reasonable.”); Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. E-6472/M-05-
1993, Excelsior Energy, Inc., at 7 (Aug. 30, 2007) (order resolving procedural issues) (noting the 
administrative law judge finding that the proposed integrated gasification combined cycle (“IGCC”) 
project is not a least cost resource and the Commission’s opinion that the cost is unreasonable). 
89. See McDermott, supra note 67, at 41. 
90. See, e.g., Daniel Cusick, Southern Co. Vows to Continue Miss. ‘Clean Coal’ Plant Despite
Mounting Losses, E&E Publ’g, LLC (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/ 
stories/1059985429. 
91. See generally Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. E-6472/M-05-1993, Excelsior Energy,
Inc. (Aug. 30, 2007). 
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Table 1: Estimated Levelized Cost of New Generation 
Resources, 2018. (2011 $/MWh)92 
Plant type Capacity 
factor 
(percent)  
Levelized 
capital 
cost  
Fixed 
O&M  
Variable 
O&M 
(including 
fuel)  
Transmission 
investment  
Total 
system 
levelized 
cost 
Dispatchable Technologies
Convent- 
ional Coal 
85  65.7  4.1  29.2  1.2  100.1 
Advanced 
Coal 
85  84.4  6.8  30.7  1.2  123.0 
Advanced 
Coal with 
CCS 
85  88.4  8.8  37.2  1.2  135.5 
Natural Gas-fired
Convent-
ional 
Combined 
Cycle 
87  15.8  1.7  48.4  1.2  67.1 
Advanced 
Combined 
Cycle 
87  17.4  2.0  45.0  1.2  65.6 
Advanced 
CC with 
CCS 
87  34.0  4.1  54.1  1.2  93.4 
Convent-
ional 
Combustion 
Turbine  
30  44.2  2.7  80.0  3.4  130.3 
Advanced 
Combustion 
Turbine  
30  30.4  2.6  68.2  3.4  104.6 
Advanced 
Nuclear  
90  83.4  11.6  12.3  1.1  108.4 
Geothermal  92  76.2  12.0  0.0  1.4  89.6 
Biomass  83  53.2  14.3  42.3  1.2  111.0 
Non-Dispatchable Technologies
Wind 34  70.3  13.1  0.0  3.2  86.6 
Wind-
Offshore 
37  193.4  22.4  0.0  5.7  221.5 
Solar PV 25  130.4  9.9  0.0  4.0  144.3 
Solar 
Thermal 
20  214.2  41.4  0.0  5.9  261.5 
Hydro 52  78.1  4.1  6.1  2.0  90.3 
92. Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2013, U.S.
Energy Info. Admin. (Jan. 2013), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/electricity_generation.pdf. 
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Unique risks associated with early applications of innovative 
technologies further complicate the least cost inquiry. These include 
financial risks, such as risk that a vendor will be unable to complete the 
project, risk of cost overruns and unforeseen spikes in capital costs, and 
technological risk.93 Due to the cost of large-scale electricity generation 
facilities, a technology failure can undermine the financial viability of an 
entire utility. For early technology applications, utilities may be unable to 
obtain firm pricing from vendors without paying a premium on an 
already expensive project, whereas it is difficult for a PUC to evaluate 
and approve a project without assurance that the utility’s cost estimate is 
credible.94 Duke Energy’s integrated gasification combined cycle 
(“IGCC”) coal plant in Edwardsport, Indiana, provides a recent example 
of the risk associated with new technologies. The plant went offline just 
six days after Duke declared the plant operational as a result of damage 
to fans required to operate the plant’s gasifiers.95 A Duke spokesperson 
told the press, “that’s not unusual with any new plant, but it is more 
common with advanced technology on this scale. We expect to deal with 
technical issues early in operations.”96 
Beyond the level of financial and technological risk, the allocation 
of risk between utility shareholders and ratepayers is an important 
question for state regulators’ public interest inquiry.97 Risk may also be 
allocated between two or more utility operating companies owned by the 
same holding company, between two or more utilities that will co-own a 
demonstration project, or between a utility and its vendors.98 If consumers 
shoulder significant financial and technological risk, construction cost 
overruns or underperformance have the potential to render a seemingly 
cost-effective project very expensive for ratepayers. 
The mechanism for cost recovery is an important factor in risk 
allocation. Traditionally, utilities have recovered invested capital plus a 
93. See generally Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n.
94. See, e.g., Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co., at 5–6 
(Apr. 14, 2008) (final order) (likening project approval to allowing ratepayers to write a blank check); see also 
Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. E-6472/M-05-1993, Excelsior Energy, Inc., at 15 (Aug. 30, 2007). 
95. Update: Duke’s Edwardsport IGCC Plant Operating Intermittently, Power Engineering
(Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.power-eng.com/articles/2013/08/dukes-edwardsport-igcc-plant-operating-
intermittently.html. 
96. Id. 
97. See, e.g., Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-014, Miss. Power Co., at 4 (Apr. 24, 
2012) (final order on remand); see also Colo. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Decision No. C09-0472, Docket 
No. 09A-15E, Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., at 6 (Apr. 27, 2009) (final order) (noting that commission staff 
opposed the project, reasoning that it constituted research and development that is properly funded by 
shareholders, and ratepayers should not be responsible for the project’s financial and operational risk). 
98. See, e.g., Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUE-2009-00030, Appalachian Power Co., at
20–21 (July 15, 2009) (final order); Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. E-6472/M-05-1993, 
Excelsior Energy, Inc., at 17 (Aug. 30, 2007). 
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reasonable rate of return through periodic general rate cases.99 Under 
this arrangement, utility rates are calculated based on used and useful 
invested capital, meaning that construction costs are not recoverable 
until the first rate case after a new unit is placed into service.100 Costs 
allowable in rates are subject to retrospective prudence reviews, thereby 
protecting ratepayers from imprudent management decisions and 
allocating a portion of the risk of cost overruns to the utility.101 
In recent years, it has been increasingly difficult for utilities to 
access capital for large generation projects with long construction 
timelines.102 States and regulators have responded by allowing recovery 
of costs incurred during construction in certain cases, sometimes as an 
incentive to promote development of specific technologies.103 However, 
relative to cost recovery through general rate cases, early recovery of 
construction costs reduces the utility’s risk and increases risk for 
ratepayers.104 For example, the Maryland Public Service Commission 
(“PSC”) found that early recovery of advanced metering infrastructure 
costs through surcharges unacceptably allocates financial risk to 
ratepayers.105 
Similarly, agreements between utilities and contractors are 
important risk allocators. Contractors may assume risk through firm 
pricing agreements or pass on costs exclusively to the utility and its 
ratepayers. For example, in the case of a proposed IGCC facility in 
Minnesota, the Public Utility Commission found that: 
Normally, independent power producers . . . offer power purchase 
contracts under which they assume the risks of plant design and 
construction. Here, the terms and conditions of the proposed contract 
shift nearly all those risks to Xcel and its ratepayers, by requiring 
payment of the full costs associated with engineering, procurement, 
and plant construction. . . . 
. . . [Though the newness of the technology complicates] setting a firm 
power price . . . the proposed contract does not even provide second-
99. ICF Int’l, Investment Decisions for Baseload Power Plants I-12 (Jan. 29, 2010), 
http://www.netl.doe.gov/energy-analyses/pubs/investmtdecsnsbsldpp4.pdf. 
100. Id. 
 101. Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Mo., 262 U.S. 276, 276 n.1 (1923) 
(explaining that the prudence standard excludes from rate base dishonest or obviously wasteful or 
imprudent expenditures). 
102. See ICF Int’l, supra note 99. 
103. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-101 (2013); see also Fla. Stat. § 366.93 (2013). 
104. Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n, Cause No. 43114, Duke Energy Ind., Inc., at 51 (Nov. 20, 2007) 
(final order). 
 105. See Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., Order No. 83410, Case No. 9208, Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., at 
7–8 (June 21, 2010) (“[W]e conclude that BGE ratepayers should not exclusively shoulder the burden 
in the event that costs associated with the Proposal are greater than expected, or that anticipated 
benefits do not materialize.”); Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. E-6472/M-05-1993, Excelsior 
Energy, Inc., at 19 (Aug. 30, 2007). 
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best protections, such as price ceilings, competitive bidding, or 
regularly scheduled prudence-review conferences.106 
PUCs can and do accept increased cost and risk in order to 
accomplish other state policy goals, such as development of in-state energy 
resources and generation diversity.107 However, specific energy policy 
goals articulated by state legislatures have played a critical role in 
facilitating PUC approval of a handful of innovative energy generation 
projects in recent years.108 Although PUCs have frequently considered 
economic development, environmental, and other broad benefits of 
innovative generation technologies, these factors alone have so far 
proven insufficient to outweigh the inherent cost and risk associated with 
demonstration projects.109 
The number of utility proposals to demonstrate or deploy innovative 
technologies in recent years is small compared to the momentous need for 
innovation in the electricity sector to meet climate mitigation and national 
security goals. One likely reason that relatively few projects have 
advanced to the stage of PUC approval (or disapproval) is reluctance on 
the part of regulated utilities to invest time and resources into projects 
that PUCs are unlikely to approve.110 Utility proposals to invest in mature 
renewable energy resources have faced similar state regulatory hurdles, 
further illustrating the challenge of implementing nascent technology.111 
To explore the intersection of energy innovation goals and state 
PUCs in detail, this Article draws on eleven recent PUC cases with well-
106. Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n at 19. 
 107. See infra Part III.A.4. (describing the importance of Mississippi’s Baseload Act, and West 
Virginia and Indiana’s preference for clean coal technology in their state PUCs’ respective decisions to 
approve IGCC plants). 
108. See infra Part III.A.4. 
109. See infra Part III.A.4. 
110. One analysis of the effect of regulation on utility innovation behavior posits that utilities 
today are more risk averse and less likely to innovate because during the 1970s many utilities 
abandoned construction of nuclear power plants and public utility commissions frequently denied cost 
recovery of imprudent expenses. See Nat’l Regulatory Research Inst., Regulatory Practices and 
Innovative Generation Technologies: Problems and New Rate-making Approaches 64 (1994). 
Utilities and merchant developers have also noted the difficulty of moving forward with innovative 
generation projects as regulated entities. See, e.g., AEP Places Carbon Capture Commercialization On 
Hold, Citing Uncertain Status Of Climate Policy, Weak Economy, Am. Elec. Power (July 14, 2011), 
http://www.aep.com/newsroom/newsreleases/Default.aspx?id=1704 (quoting Chairman and CEO 
Michael G. Morris’s statement that, “as a regulated utility it is impossible to gain regulatory approval 
to recover our share of the costs . . . without federal requirements . . . already in place”); Glenn 
Adams, Maine Offshore Wind Project Gets Key Approval, Associated Press (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/maine-offshore-wind-project-gets-key-approval (“The PUC vote was the 
biggest hurdle the Hywind Maine project faced.”). 
 111. See, e.g., Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 2009-00545, Ky. Power Co., at 8 (June 28, 2010) 
(denying Kentucky Power Company’s proposal to enter into a long-term power purchase agreement 
for wind energy); Ohio Pub. Util. Comm’n, Case Nos. 10-501-EL-FOR, 10-502-EL-FOR, Ohio Power 
Co., at 25–28 (Jan. 9, 2013) (opinion & order) (denying AEP-Ohio’s proposal to build an 
approximately fifty megawatt (“MW”) solar energy farm). 
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developed records in which utilities sought approval of large-scale 
demonstration projects. These cases include five applications to construct 
or purchase power from proposed IGCC coal facilities with and without 
CCS,112 two applications to recover the cost of demonstrating CCS 
technology on an existing coal-fired power plant,113 and four applications 
to enter into long-term contracts to purchase power from proposed 
offshore wind farms.114 The Authors have identified additional examples 
of recent utility proposals to implement innovative generation 
technologies (biomass gasification,115 grid-scale electricity storage,116 solar-
coal hybrid generation,117 solar-to-battery,118 space-based photovoltaic,119 
ocean energy120), but those cases have involved smaller scale 
demonstrations or limited documentation of the PUC decision process. 
A. Other Factors PUCs Consider When Evaluating Demonstration 
Projects 
A review of recent well-documented PUC decisions regarding utility 
proposals to demonstrate or deploy innovative technologies reveals three 
factors that regulators have deemed important, in addition to the central 
goal of minimizing cost, including hedging value, fuel diversity, and local 
economic competitiveness. This Subpart describes each factor and 
discusses the critical role of state legislation in establishing explicit energy 
policy goals guiding state regulatory approval of innovative generation 
technologies. 
 112. See generally Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n, Cause No. 43114, Duke Energy Ind., Inc. (Nov. 20, 
2007); Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. E-6472/M-05-1993, Excelsior Energy, Inc. (Aug. 30, 
2007); Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-014, Miss. Power Co. (Apr. 24, 2012); W. Va. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co. (Mar. 6, 2008) (order); 
Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co. (Apr. 14, 2008). 
 113. See generally Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUE-2009-00030, Appalachian Power Co. 
(July 15, 2009); W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 10-0699-E-42T, Appalachian Power Co. 
(Mar. 30, 2011) (order on the application for a rate increase). 
 114. Me. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 2010-00235, Order Approving Term Sheet (Feb. 26, 
2013); Mass. Dep’t Pub. Util., D.P.U. 10-54, 48–51, Mass. Elec. Co. & Nantucket Elec. Co. 
(Nov. 22, 2010); R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4111, Review of Proposed Town of New 
Shoreham Project (Apr. 2, 2010). 
 115. Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 4220-CE-169, Northern State Power Co.—Wis. (Dec. 22, 
2009) (final decision). 
 116. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 11-035-140, Rocky Mountain Power (Nov. 22, 2011) 
(report & order). 
 117. Colo. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Decision No. C09-0472, Docket No. 09A-15E, Pub. Serv. Co. of 
Colo. (Apr. 27, 2009). 
 118. Colo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Decision No. C12-0026, Docket No. 11A-713E, Pub. Serv. Co. of 
Colo. (Jan. 11, 2012) (decision granting application for rehearing, reargument, and reconsideration). 
 119. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. AL-3690-E/NB2, Resolution E-4380, Pac. Gas & 
Elec. Co. (Dec. 16, 2010). 
 120. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. AL-3181-E, Resolution E-4196, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. 
(Oct. 16, 2008). 
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1. Hedging Value
PUCs have recognized the potential for new technologies to hedge 
against risk.121 For example, regulations governing emissions of hazardous 
air pollutants and interstate transport of air emissions have increased the 
cost of generating electricity from coal in recent years.122 Future climate 
policy could dramatically alter the economics of conventional fossil-fuel 
technologies and newer low-carbon options, such as renewables and 
advanced fossil generation with CCS.123 Other forthcoming environmental 
rules, such as coal ash124 for coal-fired power plants have the potential to 
influence relative costs. Inclusion of alternative technologies in a utility’s 
generation portfolio reduces utility and ratepayer exposure to these 
environmental regulatory risks.125 Experience with construction and 
operation of certain technologies, such as CCS, could also prove valuable 
under future climate policy. 
2. Fuel Diversity
Similar to the hedging value described above, PUCs have recognized 
the inherent value of diversity in a utility’s generation portfolio, thereby 
limiting exposure to a host of risks associated with specific generation 
technologies. For example, a portfolio comprised overwhelmingly of coal 
or natural gas generation is more vulnerable to changes in fuel prices 
than a portfolio that includes a mix of coal, natural gas, nuclear, and 
renewables.126 This was an important factor in the Mississippi Public 
Service Commission’s (“MPSC”) decision to allow Mississippi Power 
Company to proceed with an IGCC coal-fired power plant that will 
capture and sixty-five percent of its CO2 emissions.
127 At the time of the 
MPSC’s decision, Mississippi Power already generated more than fifty 
percent of its electricity from natural gas.128 
 121. See, e.g., W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co., at 70 
(Mar. 6, 2008); Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n, Cause No. 43114, Duke Energy Ind., Inc., at 42–43 (Nov. 20, 2007). 
122. See generally Pratson et al., supra note 8. 
123. See ICF Int’l, supra note 99, at I-3. 
124. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 35128 
(June 21, 2010) (to be codified at scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.). 
 125. For example, the West Virginia Public Service Commission (“PSC”) found that the cost of an 
IGCC plant is nine percent cheaper than a pulverized coal plant if considering the expected cost of future 
environmental regulations. W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power 
Co., at 72 (Mar. 6, 2008). 
 126. Patrick Bean & David Hoppock, Least-Risk Planning for Electric Utilities (Nicholas Inst. for 
Envtl. Pol’y Solutions, Working Paper No. 13-05.). 
127. See generally Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-014, Miss. Power Co. (Apr. 24, 
2012). 
128. Id. at 30, 32, 82. 
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3. Local Economic Competitiveness
PUCs commonly consider economic development concerns when 
weighing utility proposals. For example, the number of jobs created or 
destroyed when a new power plant is proposed or an old plant retires 
often factors into PUC decisions. Likewise, PUCs have considered direct 
and indirect local economic development opportunities when evaluating 
proposals to implement innovative technologies. For example, PUCs 
have recognized the potential for technology to attract new industries to 
the state,129 develop under-utilized natural resources,130 or provide a new 
market for existing industries as benefits.131 
4. Explicit State Policy Goals
Although PUCs have commonly recognized the benefits of 
innovative energy generation projects described above, state legislation 
that explicitly identifies one or more factors as a public interest goal has 
factored heavily into PUC decisions to approve a limited number of 
innovative generation projects.132 For example, PUCs have recognized as 
benefits the potential for technology to attract new industries to the 
state, develop under-utilized natural resources, or provide a new market 
for existing industries.133 Virginia, which has no similar preference, 
rejected the same IGCC project that West Virginia approved on account 
of high cost and risk to ratepayers.134 Similarly, the 2008 Mississippi 
Baseload Act declares construction of diverse, baseload power plants to 
be in the public interest and directs the PUC to consider advanced 
technologies such as for coal and nuclear.135 The Baseload Act was a key 
factor in the MPSC decision to approve the IGCC coal plant referenced 
above.136 Similar deference to explicit state policy goals has aided PUC 
 129. See, e.g., Me. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 2010-00235, Order Approving Term Sheet, at 
14 (Feb. 26, 2013) (“[T]here is an unquantifiable, but nevertheless important, economic value 
associated with establishing Maine on the forefront of offshore wind development. This Project is the 
kind of investment contemplated by the Ocean Energy Act as the foundation for building a strong 
offshore wind industry in Maine.”). 
130. See generally Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-014, Miss. Power Co. (Apr. 24, 
2012). 
 131. See generally Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n, Cause No. 43114, Duke Energy Ind., Inc. (Nov. 20, 
2007); see also W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co., at 2, 70 
(Mar. 6, 2008). 
 132. See, e.g., R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4111, Review of Proposed Town of New 
Shoreham Project, at 78 (Apr. 2, 2010). 
 133. See generally Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n, Cause No. 43114; see also W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co., at 2, 70 (Mar. 6, 2008). 
134. Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co., at 8 (Apr. 14, 
2008). 
135. Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-101 (2013). 
136. See generally Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-014, Miss. Power Co. (Apr. 24, 
2012). 
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approval of a handful of offshore wind projects on the eastern 
seaboard.137 
A state policy preference for implementation of new technology has 
not always been sufficient to move demonstration projects forward, 
however.138 The following Part describes four PUC inquiries into whether 
proposed innovative generation projects satisfy the public interest, 
including the weight PUCs afforded to the benefits described above and 
the role of specific state policy goals in each PUC’s decision process. 
IV. Case Studies: PUC Decisions Regarding Innovative Electric
Power Technologies 
Recent PUC decisions from West Virginia, Virginia, Mississippi, 
and Rhode Island highlight the intersection between electric power 
technology innovation and the state PUC process. The case studies below 
describe federal programs that are dedicated to developing new electricity 
generation technologies, and PUC treatment of utility proposals to 
construct demonstration projects or enter into long-term power purchase 
agreements to purchase electricity produced by advanced technologies that 
are not currently deployed in the United States. 
A. Carbon Capture and Sequestration 
CCS is a three-step process that consists of: (1) capture and 
compression of CO2 that is released as a byproduct of fossil fuel 
combustion or industrial processes; (2) transportation of the CO2 to a 
long-term storage site, typically via pipeline; and (3) storage of the CO2 
in geologic formations to prevent its release into the atmosphere.139 With 
CCS, the power sector could reduce CO2 emissions dramatically while 
continuing to rely on fossil fuels for electricity generation. 
The U.S. Energy Information Administration’s International Energy 
Outlook 2013 reference case projects that coal will comprise a major 
portion of national and global electricity generation through 2040.140 
Global demand for coal is projected to increase for the foreseeable 
future absent significant policy intervention,141 and coal will continue to 
provide a major portion of U.S. electricity generation despite projections 
 137. See generally Mary Ann Christopher & Tom Mullooly, Early Offshore Wind PPAs Have 
Influential Supporters, N. Am. Wind Power, Oct. 2010; see also Me. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket 
No. 2010-00235, Order Approving Term Sheet, at 14 (Feb. 26, 2013). 
 138. See, e.g., Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. E-6472/M-05-1993, Excelsior Energy, Inc. 
(Aug. 30, 2007); R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4111, Review of Proposed Town of New 
Shoreham Project (Apr. 2, 2010). 
 139. See Carbon Capture and Storage, supra note 4, at 2. 
 140. International Energy Outlook 2013: Interactive Table Browser, World Installed Coal-fired 
Generating Capacity by Region and Country, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/ 
tablebrowser/#release=IEO2013 (last visited June 1, 2014).  
141. Id. 
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that the nation’s electricity sector will build few additional coal-fired 
power plants.142 Given these trends, the International Energy Agency 
describes CCS as critical to attainment of global climate mitigation 
goals.143 Though the recent boom in natural gas production contributed 
to a decline in CO2 emissions from the U.S. electricity sector,
144 energy 
modeling indicates that CCS will also be needed to control emissions 
from natural gas power plants in order to achieve significant global 
reductions in CO2 emissions.
145 
1. Federal Support for CCS
The DOE has pursued CCS research and development since 1997,146 
but launched its efforts in earnest after the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
provided a ten-year framework and authorization for CCS RD&D.147 The 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 further provided for 
seven large-scale CCS demonstration projects.148 With the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,149 Congress appropriated an 
additional $3.4 billion for CCS RD&D.150 In February 2010, President 
Obama established the Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and 
Storage and set a goal of bringing five to ten commercial demonstration 
projects online by 2016.151 The Task Force has described the focus of CCS 
RD&D efforts as twofold: (1) to demonstrate the operation of current 
CCS technologies integrated at an appropriate scale; and (2) to improve 
CCS technologies and advanced generation technologies such as 
gasification that, together, will facilitate widespread cost-effective 
deployment.152 
Although technology exists at all three steps of the CCS process, 
current methods are very expensive as applied to the power sector and 
must be integrated with power plant design at scale. For example, CO2 
capture from industrial gas streams dates to the 1930s, but existing 
capture technology is energy intensive and would reduce electricity 
142. Id. 
143. Int’l Energy Agency, Technology Roadmap: Carbon Capture and Storage 1 (2013). 
144. Energy-Related CO2 Emissions, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/early_carbonemiss.cfm. 
145. Int’l Energy Agency, supra note 143, at 15. 
146. See Folger, supra note 4, at 1. 
147. Id. at 4 (citing Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 963, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
(119 Stat.) 594, 891–92). 
 148. Id. (citing Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 
2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. (121 Stat.) 1492, 1704–16). 
 149. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
(123 Stat.) 115, 139. 
 150. FE Implementation of the Recovery Act, Office of Fossil Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 
http://energy.gov/fe/fe-implementation-recovery-act (last visited June 1, 2014). 
151. Presidential Document, 75 Fed. Reg. 6087, 6087 (Feb. 5, 2010). 
152. Carbon Capture and Storage, supra note 4, at 3.  
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output and increase electricity rates.153 The DOE estimates that 
application of current technology to a supercritical coal-fired power plant 
would increase the cost of electricity by eighty percent.154 Capture of CO2 
contributes approximately seventy to ninety percent of the cost, and as a 
result, the DOE has focused on RD&D to lower the cost of capture in 
addition to integration and demonstration of existing technologies at 
scale.155 The DOE’s portfolio also includes development of advanced 
generation technologies that simplify the process of separating CO2, such 
as gasification.156 Today, the DOE is pursuing rapid commercialization of 
cost-effective CCS technologies,157 which will require state regulatory 
approval of an increasing number of demonstration projects. 
2. The Mountaineer IGCC Project—West Virginia and Virginia
In 2007, Appalachian Power Company (APCo), a subsidiary of 
American Electric Power Company, applied to the West Virginia and 
Virginia PUCs for approval of a 629 MW “carbon capture ready” IGCC 
coal facility in Mason County, West Virginia.158 At an estimated cost of 
$2.23 billion, the project would cost twenty to thirty percent more than a 
similar size pulverized coal facility.159 APCo planned to pursue federal 
tax credits and additional state incentives to offset the cost160 and argued 
that the value of IGCC technology is its potential to cost-effectively 
capture CO2 emissions.
161 Though West Virginia regulators approved the 
project, the Virginia State Corporation Commission (“SCC”) denied 
APCo’s bid for approval, preventing the project from moving forward.162 
This project—and a similar effort by APCo to recover costs of a 
CCS demonstration project on the existing Mountaineer coal-fired power 
plant described below—provides a particularly useful case study for two 
reasons. First, because APCo serves customers in both states, this example 
highlights the disparate reactions of two state PUCs that evaluated the 
same set of facts surrounding a single proposed demonstration project. 
Second, this example serves to illustrate the added complexity of 
 153. Id. at 2. 
 154. U.S. Dep’t of Energy & Nat’l Energy Tech. Lab., DOE/NETL Carbon Dioxide Capture 
and Storage RD&D Roadmap 3 (2010). 
155. Carbon Capture and Storage, supra note 4, at 3. 
156. Capture and Storage RD&D Roadmap, supra note 154, at 12–13. 
157. Id. at 3. 
158. Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co., at 1 (Apr. 14, 
2008). 
159. Id. 
 160. W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co., at 65–66 
(Mar. 6, 2008). 
161. Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co., at 13 
(Apr. 14, 2008). 
 162. Id. at 2. 
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demonstration projects that require approval from multiple state PUCs 
because many utilities operate across state lines.  
a. West Virginia PSC Evaluation
The West Virginia PSC approved APCo’s application on March 6, 
2008, though not without concern.163 The PSC began its evaluation of the 
project by stating four broad concerns regarding cost and risk: (1) even if 
the project were completed under budget, it would be the single most 
expensive project ever considered by the commission; (2) the direction of 
federal climate policy is uncertain, and a primary benefit of the project is 
its potential to cost effectively meet these unknown future standards; 
(3) the special ratemaking treatment requested by APCo—which would 
allow recovery of costs during construction—places an early and 
substantial burden on the consuming public; and (4) IGCC and CCS 
technologies are relatively new and therefore inherently risky. However, 
the PSC reasoned, a host of other factors tipped the scale in favor of 
approval, including the fact that “specific statutory provisions relating to 
the Commission, direct[] the Commission to ‘[e]ncourage the well-
planned development of utility resources in a manner consistent with 
state needs and in ways consistent with the productive use of the State’s 
energy resources, such as coal.’”164 
While West Virginia’s stated preference for utility resources that 
support an ongoing market for the state’s natural resources—a local 
economic development concern—was a key factor in the PSC’s decision, 
the commission also recognized the project’s value as a hedge against 
future environmental regulations.165 
b. Virginia SCC Evaluation
On April 14, 2008, the Virginia SCC evaluated the same set of facts 
and came to the contrary conclusion that “it is neither reasonable nor 
prudent for APCo to construct the proposed IGCC Plant.”166 As with the 
West Virginia PSC, the SCC began with an inquiry into the project’s cost 
and risk. First, the SCC found that the company’s cost estimate was not 
credible.167 In particular, the SCC noted the absence of a fixed price 
contract and meaningful price or performance guarantees.168 The SCC 
further expressed concern regarding the company’s own doubts as to 
whether it could obtain firm pricing without paying an “exorbitant risk 
163. W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n at 2. 
164. Id. at 2 (citing W. Va. Code § 24-1-1 (2008)). 
165. Id. at 70, 72. 
166. Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co., at 2–3 
(Apr. 14, 2008). 
167. Id. at 5. 
168. Id. 
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premium” given the complexity and duration of the project.169 In 
addition, the SCC noted that uncertainty in the cost estimate is 
compounded by the question of whether IGCC is a mature technology.170 
While West Virginia regulators described IGCC as a mature but 
relatively new technology,171 the SCC questioned the maturity of the 
technology at scale and the expected capacity factor of the plant.172 
With regard to the value of hedging against future environmental 
compliance costs—which the West Virginia commission recognized as 
potentially significant—the Virginia SCC dismissed any potential 
benefits as uncertain. The SCC stressed that the addition of CCS would 
add hundreds of millions of dollars to the total cost and would be driven 
by climate policy “that is yet to come.”173 The SCC further reasoned that 
uncertainty surrounding the technology, cost, and future policy rendered 
it impossible to assess the potential CO2 benefits of the proposed plant.
174 
3. The Mountaineer CCS Demonstration Project—West Virginia
and Virginia
Undeterred by the 2008 failure to gain approval for the IGCC 
facility, APCo sought approval from West Virginia and Virginia 
regulators in 2009 to include in electricity rates the cost already incurred 
during phase I of a CCS demonstration project at the existing 
Mountaineer pulverized coal-fired power plant in Mason County, West 
Virginia. APCo’s parent company, AEP, launched the demonstration 
project in partnership with Alstom, RWE, the National Energy 
Technology Laboratory, and the Battelle Memorial Institute.175 The 
phase I pilot project operated between twelve and eighteen months, 
capturing CO2 from a thirty MW side slip,
176 and was the first CCS 
demonstration project on an in-service coal plant.177 Phase II would have 
entailed a commercial-scale demonstration of carbon capture, with the 
DOE providing a grant for fifty percent of the project costs ($334 
169. Id. at 5–6. 
170. Id. at 11. 
171. W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co., at 70 (Mar. 6, 
2008). 
 172. Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co., at 11–12 
(Apr. 14, 2008). 
173. Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted). 
174. Id. at 7–9. 
175. AEP Mountaineer Fact Sheet: Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Project, Carbon Capture 
& Sequestration Tech. Program, Mass. Inst. of Tech. (Jan. 30, 2014), 
http://sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects/aep_alstom_mountaineer.html. 
176. Id. 
177. W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co., at 19 (Mar. 6, 
2008). 
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million), but AEP cancelled the project citing the difficulty of recovering 
project costs as a regulated utility, among other challenges.178 
a. West Virginia Evaluation
Here, the West Virginia PSC acknowledged the broad societal 
benefits of testing CCS technology but was “troubled” by the cost recovery 
request for a number of reasons.179 First, when the PSC approved the 
IGCC project described above, it specifically held that retrofitting with 
CCS would constitute a major modification and require a CPCN.180 In the 
present case, APCo did not file for a CPCN for CCS demonstration 
project.181 Though phase I consisted of a small-scale pilot project, the 
cost—$30.9 million—was nontrivial.182 
Further, the West Virginia PSC articulated a broader responsibility 
for sharing the cost of demonstration projects with diffuse benefits, 
stating, “We believe that this operating cost also needs to be shared 
among all AEP operating facilities.”183 Accordingly, the PSC allowed a 
portion of the cost commensurate with APCo’s share of AEP load.184 The 
PSC acknowledged its lack of authority to allocate the remaining cost to 
other AEP jurisdictions, but stated that AEP companies and state 
regulatory commissions can and should cooperate.185 
b. Virginia Evaluation
In response to APCo’s request to recover a portion of the CCS 
demonstration project costs through its rates, the Virginia SCC again 
articulated the difficulty of asking ratepayers to shoulder the cost of 
demonstration projects with diffuse societal benefits. Here, the 
commission stated: 
It is reasonable for AEP to evaluate and explore options regarding 
potential federal legislation or regulation regarding GHG emissions. 
We do not find, however, that it was reasonable for APCo to incur the 
Mountaineer CCS project costs and then seek recovery from Virginia 
ratepayers. . . . [A]lthough AEP asserts that this demonstration project 
will benefit customers of all of AEP’s operating companies and of all 
 178. Am. Elec. Power, supra note 110 (quoting Chairman and CEO’s statement that, “as a 
regulated utility, it is impossible to gain regulatory approval to recover our share of the costs . . . 
without federal requirements . . . already in place”). 
179. W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, at 47. 
180. Id. at 79. 
181. Id. at 45. 
182. Id. at 45. 
183. Id. at 47. 
184. Id. at 47–48. 
185. Id. at 48. 
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utilities in the United States, APCo’s ratepayers (not shareholders) are 
being asked to pay for all of the costs incurred by this project.186 
In contrast to West Virginia’s solution of allowing recovery for only a fair 
share of the demonstration project costs, the Virginia SCC denied the 
entire request.187 
4. The Kemper County IGCC Project—Mississippi
At the time of writing, Mississippi Power Company, a subsidiary of 
Southern Company, is constructing a 582 MW IGCC power plant in 
Kemper County Mississippi, known as Plant Ratcliffe.188 Plant Ratcliffe 
will burn locally mined lignite coal and capture sixty-five percent of its 
CO2 emissions for enhanced oil recovery.
189 The plant has an expected 
operation date of 2015.190 Plant Ratcliffe was one of two projects selected 
to receive a federal loan guarantee under round two of the DOE’s Clean 
Coal Power Initiative but has since withdrawn its application, stating that 
the company can obtain lower cost financing elsewhere.191 
Plant Ratcliffe is the only advanced coal plant with CCS that is 
under construction in the United States.192 Though the Mississippi PSC 
approved the project in May 2010,193 state regulatory approval has 
presented an ongoing challenge. The Mississippi commission denied the 
company’s initial bid to construct Plant Ratcliffe on April 29, 2010.194 At 
that time, the PSC held that, as proposed, the benefits would not outweigh 
the costs and risks borne by ratepayers.195 It also found, however, the 
project could in concept benefit ratepayers.196 The PSC invited Mississippi 
 186. Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUE-2009-00030, Appalachian Power Co., at 20 
(July 15, 2010) (final order) (emphasis added).  
187. Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co., at 2 (Apr. 14, 
2008). 
 188. Kemper County IGCC Fact Sheet: Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Project, Carbon 
Capture & Sequestration Tech. Program, Mass. Inst. of Tech. (Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects/kemper.html. 
 189. See id.; see also Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-014, Miss. Power Co., at 6, 
89, 91 (Apr. 24, 2012). 
 190. Eileen O’Grady, Southern Co Delays Advanced Coal Plant to 2015 Amid Rising Costs, 
Reuters (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/29/utilities-southern-kemper-
idUSL2N0NL2K220140429. 
191. Id. 
 192. The Texas Clean Energy Project, Hydrogen Energy California, and FutureGen 2.0 are in the 
planning stages and considered active CCS demonstration projects. See The United States CCS 
Financing Overview, Carbon Capture & Sequestration Tech. Program, Mass. Inst. of Tech. 
(Dec. 20, 2013), http://sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects/us_ccs_background.html. In addition, Duke 
Energy is constructing a “CCS-ready” IGCC coal plant in Edwardsport, Indiana, but has no current 
plan to install CCS. See Edwardsport Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) Station, Duke 
Energy, http://www.duke-energy.com/pdfs/igcc-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited June 1, 2014). 
193. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-14, Miss. Power Co. (Apr. 29, 2010).  
194. Id. at 49. 
195. Id. at 2. 
196. Id. 
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Power Company to submit an alternative proposal that equitably 
distributes the project’s uncertainties and risks.197 Approximately one 
month later, the PSC approved the company’s amended proposal in a 
two-to-one vote.198 In February 2011, the Mississippi Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded the Commission’s order on appeal, holding that 
the PSC had not supported its decision to approve the facility with 
substantial evidence.199 In another two-to-one vote, the PSC affirmed its 
decision to approve the plant on April 24, 2012, drawing on the existing 
record to substantiate its decision.200 
In contrast to the West Virginia and Virginia commissions, the 
Mississippi PSC began its initial evaluation of the IGCC project proposal 
with a discussion of its benefits.201 First, the PSC found that the project 
would meet an existing need for stable, baseload energy.202 Here, the PSC 
relied upon the state’s recently enacted Baseload Act,203 which 
establishes a preference for diverse baseload generation, in its decision to 
impart particular importance on this feature.204 Notably, the Baseload 
Act declares “that the State should take advantage of advances in 
nuclear, coal and other technologies, including technologies that reduce 
or minimize, or that facilitate the future reduction or minimization of, 
regulated air emissions.”205 
Next, the PSC assigned significant weight to the project’s contribution 
to fuel diversity, noting that Mississippi Power’s generation portfolio was 
already more than fifty percent natural gas and would reach seventy 
percent if the company relied on natural gas to meet its need rather than 
the proposed IGCC facility.206 Plant Ratcliffe will burn lignite—a lower-
ranked and lower-priced coal—that is mined locally with minimal 
transportation cost.207 
In addition, the PSC noted that the proposed plant would ensure 
compliance with existing environmental laws and regulations and 
mitigate risk of future climate change legislation.208 Beyond the ratepayer 
benefits of environmental compliance, the PSC found that the project 
would contribute to clean coal and enhanced oil recovery technology and 
thereby contribute to national energy security and efforts to mitigate 
197. Id. at 2–3. 
198. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-14, Miss. Power Co., at 25 (May 26, 2010). 
199. Sierra Club v. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 82 So. 3d 618, 618 (Miss. 2012). 
200. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-014, Miss. Power Co., at 132 (Apr. 24, 2012). 
201. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-14, Miss. Power Co., at 2 (Apr. 29, 2010). 
202. Id. at 6. 
203. Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-101 (2008). 
204. Id. 
 205. Id. § 77-3-101(c). 
206. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-014, Miss. Power Co., at 30, 32, 82 (Apr. 24, 2012). 
207. Id. at 89. 
208. Id. at 91. 
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climate change.209 While the broad national benefits of Plant Ratcliffe 
would accrue beyond Mississippi Power’s ratepayers, the PSC 
acknowledged a number of government grants, tax incentives, and loan 
programs that would defray a portion of the costs.210 
Finally, the PSC pointed to state and local economic development 
opportunities that would flow from Plant Ratcliffe. For example, the 
project would directly create temporary jobs to construct the IGCC plant 
and nearby lignite mine, create permanent jobs at the power and mine 
facilities, and increase mineral royalties and state and local tax revenues.211 
In addition, Plant Ratcliffe would provide a catalyst to expand lignite 
business opportunities, which represent a large and relatively untapped 
Mississippi natural resource, and foster enhanced oil recovery projects 
within the state.212 
However, the PSC also identified and expressed concern regarding a 
number of risks associated with Plant Ratcliffe, including risks associated 
with construction of any baseload facility and implementation of a new 
technology.213 For example, like all large electric utility capital investments, 
Plant Ratcliffe bears capital cost risk and project cancellation risk.214 In 
addition, the project carries performance risk, first of a kind technology 
risk, potential loss of federal incentives, and risk that expected 
supplemental revenue streams—CO2, ammonia, and sulfuric acid 
byproducts, which the company intends to sell to offset ratepayer costs—
never materialize.215 
Several measures to mitigate and allocate risk were critical to the 
PSC’s approval, including: (1) allowance for recovery of only a fraction of 
construction costs rather than the full costs incurred during construction;216 
(2) a cost cap of twenty percent ($2.88 billion) above the company’s 
approved estimate, shifting risk to the utility for any construction cost 
overruns beyond the cap;217 (3) performance parameters to assure that 
ratepayers will not pay for an underperforming asset;218 and (4) a 
requirement to periodically reevaluate the economics to mitigate risk 
that a subsequent technology becomes a better option.219 Plant Ratcliffe 
has since faced considerable construction cost overruns that have 
209. Id. at 92–93. 
210. Id. at 91. 
211. Id. at 92. 
212. Id. at 92–93. 
213. Id. at 82. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 82, 85–86. 
216. Id. at 106. 
217. Id. at 9, 21. 
218. Id. at 9. 
219. Id. 
June 2014]    COMPLETING THE ENERGY INNOVATION CYCLE 1377 
increased the facility’s estimated cost to approximately $5.5 billion, 
nearly double the $2.88 billion cap.220 
B. Offshore Wind 
Offshore winds are stronger and blow more consistently than winds 
over land.221 The DOE estimates the nation’s offshore energy resource, 
including the Great Lakes, is approximately four times the combined 
generating capacity of all U.S. power plants.222 Offshore wind technology 
has the potential to capture this abundant renewable energy resource, 
contribute to greenhouse gas reduction and renewable energy goals, and 
provide coastal populations with a local renewable energy option.223 
However, offshore wind faces a number of challenges to development 
and deployment in the United States, including high cost relative to 
alternative fossil fuel and renewable energy technologies,224 technical 
challenges to installation and interconnection with the electricity grid, 
and permitting challenges in federal and state waters.225 Europe has 
successfully developed shallow water offshore wind technology, with 
approximately 2000 MW installed capacity, but the European market is 
heavily subsidized.226A recent market analysis describes the U.S. offshore 
wind industry as in a slow transition from early development to 
commercial demonstration.227 In addition, accessing the abundant wind 
resources located in deep waters off the coast of the United States will 
require innovative wind turbine designs.228 
1. Federal Support for Offshore Wind
From 2006 to 2012, the DOE awarded more than $300 million to 
offshore wind RD&D.229 The DOE is focused on reducing the cost of 
offshore wind energy to accelerate development and deployment of 
offshore wind in the United States through its Offshore Wind Innovation 
and Demonstration initiative (“OSWInD”).230 The DOE estimates that a 
fifty percent reduction in cost of energy projections is necessary to 
achieve a scenario of fifty-four gigawatts of offshore wind deployed by 
220. O’Grady, supra note 190.  
 221. Wind & Water Power Tech. Office, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Offshore Wind Projects 2006–
2012, at 2 (2012). 
222. Id. 
223. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, A National Offshore Wind Strategy: Creating an Offshore Wind 
Industry in the United States 6–7 (2011). 
224. See supra Part III.B. tbl. 1. 
225. National Offshore Wind Strategy, supra note 223, at 2. 
226. Id. at 5–6. 
227. Navigant Consulting, Inc., Offshore Wind Market and Economic Analysis xv (2013). 
228. Offshore Wind Projects 2006–2012, supra note 221, at 1. 
229. Id. at 2. 
230. National Offshore Wind Strategy, supra note 223, at 2. 
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2030.231 In addition to reducing the costs of various components, start-up 
and permitting processes, and grid interconnection, achieving a lower cost 
of capital for offshore wind development requires demonstration and 
validation of offshore wind technologies.232 In the short term, OSWInD is 
focused on the initial deployment of offshore wind technology in U.S. 
waters,233 such as the projects described in this Article that have come 
before utility commissions in several eastern states. OSWInD’s longer-
term research and development efforts seek to develop new cost-
competitive offshore wind technologies.234 The federal government also 
remains focused on resolving federal and state permitting issues, related 
to leasing of federal waters for wind farms and related transmission 
infrastructure and environmental reviews.235 
2. The Block Island Offshore Wind Demonstration Project—Rhode
Island
In 2009, Rhode Island enacted a Long Term Contracting Standard for 
Renewable Energy, which directed the state’s electric distribution 
companies to annually solicit proposals from renewable energy developers 
for long-term contacts subject to PUC approval.236 The Act directed the 
Rhode Island PUC to approve such contracts if they are “commercially 
reasonable,”237 defined as: “terms and pricing that are reasonably 
consistent with what an experienced power market analyst would expect 
to see in transactions involving newly developed renewable energy 
resources.”238 It also established that the public interest would be served 
by a small-scale offshore wind demonstration project off the coast of 
Block Island.239 The legislation also identified a number of benefits the 
Block Island project would provide, including local economic development 
benefits of becoming a forerunner in the nascent offshore wind industry, 
and its contribution to energy independence and reduced reliance on fossil 
fuels.240 Although Rhode Island is a restructured state, relying on a 
competitive market for electricity generation as opposed to vertically 
integrated utilities, the Rhode Island PUC has jurisdiction over long-
term power purchase agreements between regulated distribution utilities 
231. Id. at iii, 9.  
232. Id. at 9–10. 
233. Id. at 14. 
234. Id. 
235. See id. at 10–13. 
236. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 39-26.1-3(a)–(b) (2010). 
237. Id. § 39-26.1-3(b). 
238. Id. § 39-26.1-2(1). 
239. Id. § 39-26.1-7(a). 
240. Id. 
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and merchant developers.241 As noted earlier, merchant firms are free to 
pursue generation projects without PUC approval, but implementation 
of novel technologies typically requires developers to secure long-term 
contracts to convince investors that there is a market for above-market 
generation.242 
National Grid—the electric distribution company serving all but a 
small corner of Rhode Island—solicited proposals and received a single 
application from Deepwater Wind to construct an offshore wind 
demonstration project off the coast of Block Island.243 The project would 
consist of six wind turbines with a nameplate capacity of 21.6 MW.244 The 
Rhode Island PUC rejected the proposed long-term contract, finding the 
project commercially unreasonable.245 Two months after the PUC rejected 
the proposed power purchase agreement, the general assembly amended 
the definition of “commercially reasonable,” only as it applied to the Block 
Island project, to “terms and pricing that are reasonably consistent with 
what an experience power market analyst would expect to see for a project 
of similar size, technology, and location.”246 The amendment also required 
the Rhode Island PUC to expedite review of an amended power 
purchase agreement and specified that the new contract must include a 
mechanism whereby ratepayers receive the full benefit of any savings 
relative to the estimated project costs.247 National Grid then reapplied to 
the Rhode Island PUC with an amended proposal for a long-term power 
purchase agreement for the Block Island project, and the Rhode Island 
PUC approved the amended proposal two-to-one.248 
a. Rhode Island Initial Evaluation
The Rhode Island PUC based its initial decision to reject the Block 
Island power purchase agreement solely on the above-market cost of 
energy. Relying on the original definition of commercially reasonable, 
the PUC concluded that the price (24.4 cents per kilowatt-hour (“kWh”), 
escalating annually at 3.5 percent) was higher than an experienced power 
market analyst would expect to see for transactions involving newly 
 241. See supra Part III.A (explaining the role of PUCs in restructured states in overseeing 
innovative energy projects). 
242. See supra Part III.A. 
 243. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4111, Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham 
Project, at 3 (Apr. 2, 2010). 
244. Id. at 4. 
245. Id. at 68. 
246. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-26.1-7(c)(iv) (2010) (emphasis added); see also In re Review of 
Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 496 (R.I. 2011).  
247. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 39-26.1-7(a)–(b), (e). 
 248. See generally R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4185, Proposed Town of New Shoreham 
Project Pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-26.1-7 (Aug. 16, 2010). 
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developed renewable energy resources.249 Notably, the Rhode Island 
PUC further concluded that “[t]he pricing of the PPA must stand or fall 
on its own,” excluding consideration of benefits such as economic 
development.250 
Despite the Rhode Island PUC’s explicit exclusion of non-cost 
project values, the PUC also determined that the record could not 
support a finding that project benefits justify the $390 million in above-
market costs, even if the commercially reasonable standard required 
consideration of project benefits.251 Here, the Rhode Island PUC relied 
on Deepwater Wind’s estimate of approximately $2.4 million in annual 
direct economic benefits.252 The commission reasoned that any evidence 
of “first-mover” benefits that may accrue from “getting something in the 
water that permitting agencies and financial markets can understand and 
accept” are not based on Rhode Island-specific studies, and therefore 
cannot be quantified or seriously considered.253 
b. Rhode Island Round Two Evaluation
In the Rhode Island PUC’s subsequent decision to approve the 
amended power purchase agreement, the commission began with a 
recognition that it is “a creature of statute, and . . . possesses only those 
powers, duties, and responsibilities conferred upon it by the General 
Assembly.”254 The commission’s evaluation then recognized that the 
General Assembly “substantially altered” the standard of review in this 
case so as to “dramatically reduce[] the plenary discretion afforded to the 
Commission” as it pertains to the commercial reasonableness of the 
project.255 Applying the new definition of commercially reasonable—
requiring “terms and pricing that are reasonably consistent with what an 
experienced power market analyst would expect to see for a project of 
similar size, technology, and location,”256—the Rhode Island PUC 
considered the testimony of four expert witnesses, excluded consideration 
of the cost of projects of different scale and projects that employ other 
renewable energy technologies, and concluded that the project met the 
new standard.257 However, the Commission also observed that the 
 249. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4111, Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham 
Project, at 68 (Apr. 2, 2010). 
250. Id. at 69. 
251. Id. at 78. 
252. Id. at 78–79. 
253. Id. at 79–80. 
254. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4185, Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project 
Pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-26.1-7, at 129 (Aug. 16, 2010). 
255. Id. at 129–30. 
 256. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-26.1-7(c)(iv) (2010) (emphasis added); see also In re: Review of 
Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 496 (R.I. 2011). 
257. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4185, at 130–36. 
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General Assembly mandated the standard of review “[f]or purposes of 
review of this one single PPA,” meaning that future proposals would have 
to meet the original, more stringent, commercially reasonable standard.258 
C. Challenges to Technology Innovation in the State Regulatory 
Process 
The above case studies highlight several challenges to PUC approval 
of utility-scale energy demonstration projects: high, uncertain costs; 
uncertain economic benefits; interstate generation requiring approval 
from multiple state PUCs; and diffuse societal benefits. 
1. High, Uncertain Costs
Demonstration projects tend to be expensive compared to mature 
generation projects, which have benefited from technological learning 
and economies of scale. In addition, it is inherently difficult to estimate 
construction and operating costs of projects that rely on new technologies. 
As a result, it is difficult for PUCs—charged with ensuring that electricity 
rates are just and reasonable—to allow ratepayers to accept the cost and 
risk of demonstration projects. 
Allowing ratepayers to fund certain types of demonstration projects 
can be especially challenging because these projects are expensive 
relative to other demonstration projects in the electricity sector. For 
example, the nation’s largest smart grid demonstration project will cost 
$178 million,259 shared between the DOE (fifty percent) and other project 
participants, including eleven utilities, Bonneville Power Administration, 
and private investors.260 One utility’s share of the cost—such as the 
$2.1 million that Northwest Energy will invest—is a small fraction of the 
costs of advanced coal demonstration projects described above.261 Even 
the total project cost of $178 million is substantially lower than APCo’s 
$334 million share of the CCS demonstration project proposed at the 
Mountaineer coal-fired power plant. The Block Island offshore wind 
demonstration project off the coast of Rhode Island is estimated to cost 
ratepayers $370 million in above-market energy costs.262 The project 
developer testified that a larger offshore wind farm could produce energy 
at a lower price, but would be inadvisable to pursue until permitting 
258. Id. at 132. 
 259. Carl Imhoff, Largest U.S. Smart Grid Demo is Set to Roll, IEEE: Smart Grid (June 2012), 
http://smartgrid.ieee.org/june-2012/601-largest-u-s-smart-grid-demo-project-is-set-to-roll. 
260. About the Project, Pac. Nw. Smart Grid Demonstration Project, 
http://www.pnwsmartgrid.org/about.asp (last visited June 1, 2014). 
 261. Smart Grid, Nw. Energy, http://www.northwesternenergy.com/our-company/environmental-
commitment/smart-grid (last visited June 1, 2014). 
262. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4185, at 103. 
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authorities and financial markets become familiar with the technology 
through smaller scale, but higher cost, demonstrations.263 
2. Uncertain Economic Benefits
Innovative low-carbon generation technologies have the potential to 
provide direct benefits to ratepayers through reduced compliance costs if 
and when the utility faces a policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Without a policy in place, however, the timing and magnitude of those 
benefits are unknown, making it difficult for state utility regulators to 
weigh the costs and benefits of proposed projects. For example, the 
Virginia PUC, in its denial of a certificate of need for the Appalachian 
Power Company’s proposed IGCC project, discounted any potential 
climate policy compliance benefits due to policy uncertainty.264 
3. Challenges of Interstate Cooperation
Utility service areas frequently cross state boundaries, complicating 
the task of securing regulatory approval for new investments. The 
differential treatment of advanced coal projects in West Virginia and 
Virginia illustrates the added risk for projects that require the approval of 
multiple state PUCs. Further complicating the challenge of interstate 
cooperation, certain economic benefits of demonstration projects—jobs, 
economic development, potentially creating demand for coal—accrue 
primarily to the state where the plant is located. 
Although cooperation across multiple states is inherently more 
difficult than individual state action, a group of states working together 
would have significant advantages over individual state action. Sharing 
costs and risks across multiple utilities in multiple states reduces rate 
impacts and makes financing multiple, full-scale demonstration projects 
feasible from a consumer protection perspective. 
4. Diffuse Societal Benefits
In addition to any direct benefits to ratepayers from reduced future 
compliance costs, demonstration projects provide learning benefits to the 
U.S. economy, the electricity sector, and all electricity consumers.265 
Additional benefits to implementing utilities and their ratepayers—such 
as the development of engineering protocols that improve reliability and 
 263. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4111, Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham 
Project, at 83 (Apr. 2, 2010). 
 264. Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Case No. PUC-2007-00068, Appalachian Power Co., at 6–7 
(Apr. 14, 2008). 
 265. See Sonia Yeh & Edward S. Rubin, A Review of Uncertainties in Technology Experience 
Curves, 34 Energy Econ. 762 (2012). 
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reduce the cost of future applications,266 or the attraction of a budding 
industry to the state—are similarly long term and uncertain.267 It is 
difficult, therefore, for a utility commission to ask one utility’s ratepayers, 
or subset of ratepayers, to bear the cost and risk of a project with 
widespread benefits. The diffuse benefits from technology development 
may be larger than project benefits realized by ratepayers, especially for 
small-scale demonstration projects with minor emissions reductions, 
further discouraging commission approval of ratepayer support for these 
types of projects. 
With the exception of policies promoting renewable energy and 
energy efficiency,268 utility regulation in the United States is generally not 
designed to extend costs beyond a utility’s service area. As a result, 
approving demonstration projects requires commissions to make the 
difficult decision that ratepayers within a particular service area should 
bear the cost and risk of a project with widespread benefits. Statutory 
directives for utility regulators to encourage the continued use of coal 
facilitated commission approval of advanced coal projects in Indiana and 
West Virginia.269 Similarly, Mississippi commissioners approved an IGCC 
project to balance the utility’s heavy reliance on natural gas, citing the 
legislature’s directive to seek diverse, baseload energy resources.270 
However, construction cost overruns in Indiana and Mississippi, low 
natural gas prices, climate policy uncertainty, and fewer federal dollars 
suggest that these decisions will become even more difficult without 
innovative strategies that protect ratepayers and provide for an equitable 
distribution of costs and benefits. 
V.  Addressing State-Level Barriers to Electric Power 
Technology Innovation 
A. The Innovation Premium 
Constructing new electricity generation facilities is inherently costly. 
Even a natural gas-fired combined cycle power plant—currently boasting 
 266. See, e.g., Colo. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Decision No. C09-0472, Docket No. 09A-15E, Pub. Serv. 
Co. of Colo., at 8 (Apr. 27, 2009). 
 267. See Me. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 2010-00235, Order Approving Term Sheet, at 10–11 
(Feb. 26, 2013). 
 268. A major difference between advanced coal and renewable energy/energy efficiency is the size of 
individual projects and their capital costs. Policies that spread the cost of energy efficiency/renewable 
energy projects across all ratepayers tend to have relatively small impacts on rates. However, the theory 
behind widely sharing the cost of renewable energy/energy efficiency projects, which create external 
benefits such as improved air quality and technological advancement, is similar to the rationale for 
sharing the costs of advanced coal projects. The goal of the policy tools proposed here is to similarly share 
costs so that advanced coal projects have relatively small rate impacts. 
 269. See generally Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n, Cause No. 43114, Duke Energy Ind., Inc. (Nov. 20, 
2007); W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co. (Mar. 6, 2008). 
270. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-14, Miss. Power Co. (Apr. 29, 2010). 
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the lowest total levelized cost of electricity among conventional 
generation options—can cost well over $500 million to construct.271 When 
a PUC considers a utility proposal to construct a new generation facility 
or enter into a power purchase agreement, the commission typically asks 
two questions: Does the utility need the additional generation or capacity 
to meet demand? If so, is the proposed facility the best (least-cost) 
alternative to meet that need?272 This inquiry conceives consumer benefit 
as primarily the availability of electrons to reliably meet electricity 
demand at the lowest reasonable rate. Utilities and other participants in 
these proceedings may also introduce secondary considerations, such as 
local economic development benefits of specific projects—the number of 
jobs created, the estimated increase in state and local tax revenues.273 
As Part III of this Article explains, early applications of new 
technology can carry significant additional costs and technology risks. 
Whereas mature technologies have benefited from the learning process 
and economies of scale, learning is a primary benefit of putting innovative 
technologies into practice. Implementation of novel technology is also 
inherently risky. The technology could fail, underperform, or cost 
substantially more than expected. Furthermore, the benefits of innovative 
generation projects include factors that are more difficult to quantify and 
accrue well beyond a utility’s service area. For example, demonstration 
projects create learning benefits that feed back into the innovation cycle 
and contribute to improvements in cost and performance of later 
applications of similar technology.274 
The difference between the cost and risks associated with a 
conventional electricity generation technology and an innovative 
demonstration project creates an innovation premium.275 PUCs have 
recognized the broad social benefits of innovative generation projects 
but the diffuse learning benefits of technology innovation often do not 
outweigh the premium that ratepayers must pay to implement innovative 
generation technologies.276 In this sense, the innovation premium is a 
 271. For example, Indianapolis Power and Light is constructing a 650 MW natural gas combined 
cylce plant for $631 million. See PennEnergy Editorial Staff, IPL to Build a 650 Combined-Cycle Gas 
Turbine Power Station, PennEnergy (May 1, 2013), www.pennenergy.com/articles/pennenergy/2013/ 
05/ipl-to-build-650-mw-combined-cycle-natural-gas -turbine-power-station.html. 
 272. See generally Jones, supra note 24 (explaining the mandate of the PUC to ensure reliable 
electricity at a reasonable cost).  
 273. See, e.g., R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 4185, Proposed Town of New Shoreham 
Project Pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-26.1-7, at 63, 93, 114 (Aug. 16, 2010). 
 274. Kelly Sims Gallagher et al., The Energy Technology Innovation System, 37 Ann. Rev. Env’t 
Resources 137, 140 (2012). The authors also replace the deployment phase with “market formation 
and diffusion.” Id. fig. 1. 
 275. For example, the West Virginia public utility commissions noted that an IGCC coal plant is 
estimated to cost twenty to thirty percent more than a pulverized coal plant. See W. Va. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, Case No. 06-0033-E-CN, Appalachian Power Co., at 72 (Mar. 6, 2008). 
276. See supra Part IV. 
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barrier to widespread demonstration and deployment of a host of 
technologies needed to meet national energy goals. The remainder of 
this Part outlines two possible solutions: (1) ensuring that ratepayers 
capture more of the added benefits of innovation; and (2) allocating the 
innovation premium more widely to reflect the widespread benefits of 
innovation. The details and feasibility of these and other possible solutions 
should be explored in future research. 
B. Allocating the Innovation Premium: Aligning Costs and 
Benefits of Innovative Electricity Generation Projects 
Numerous options exist to address the premium associated with first 
generation energy technologies. A direct strategy for addressing the 
premium, for example, is to reduce the cost difference between 
conventional technologies and new technologies, either by reducing the 
cost of new technologies or increasing the cost of conventional 
technologies. As described above, the federal government currently has 
numerous programs aimed at reducing the cost of new energy 
technologies.277 Federal programs, such as loan guarantees, can lower the 
cost of capital by reducing investment risk, and tax incentives that provide 
additional income for certain types of electricity generation can also 
reduce the cost of a new technology. Market-based strategies, such as the 
carbon markets in California and the Northeastern states278 and the EPA’s 
Acid Rain Program279 create a price for emitting specific pollutants, 
thereby raising the cost of operating facilities with high emissions (e.g., 
coal) and making zero emitting technologies, such as nuclear energy or 
renewable energy, more competitive.280 While these strategies may 
mitigate the cost premium, technology risks could remain a concern. 
This Subpart provides an overview of three additional strategies for 
addressing the innovation premium. First, policymakers could ensure 
that ratepayers capture a larger portion of the broad benefits that accrue 
from demonstration and deployment of novel technologies. Second, 
policymakers could spread the innovation premium over a larger populace 
to reduce the per capita premium for ratepayers, commensurate with 
widespread societal benefits. Third, multi-utility or multi-state innovative 
277. See supra Part I. 
 278. See Cap-and-Trade Program, Ca. Envtl. Protection Agency Air Resources Board (May 
21, 2014), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm; Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, http://www.rggi.org (last visited June 1, 2014).  
279. See Acid Rain Program, Envtl. Protection Agency: Clean Air Markets (July 25, 2012), 
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp.  
 280. Lori A. Bird et al., Implications of Carbon Cap-and-Trade for US Voluntary Renewable 
Energy Markets, 36 Energy Pol’y 2063, 2064 (2008) (explaining that “[i]n general, renewable energy 
will benefit from carbon cap-and-trade programs because compliance with the cap will increase the 
costs of fossil fuel generation, which will improve the cost-effectiveness of renewables and may 
provide an incentive to capped entities to use renewable energy to meet future load growth”).  
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technology portfolio standards can spread the costs of a new facility 
beyond a single utility’s ratepayers, while also providing market demand 
for the technologies. 
1. Capturing the Added Benefits of Innovation
While the traditional ratepayer benefit of utility investments consists 
of reliable service at reasonable rates,281 utilities and PUCs can adopt 
measures that help ratepayers capture a portion of the added benefits of 
innovation, offsetting the innovation premium at least in part. For 
example, technology development and operational knowledge gains are 
key benefits of demonstration projects. Though it is impossible to 
capture all of the learning benefits of an individual project, intellectual 
property laws allow companies to capture a portion of these benefits 
through patents.282 PUCs can require utilities to share monetized learning 
benefits with ratepayers to ensure that these added benefits of innovation 
are divided in accordance with the allocation of cost and risk. For example, 
as part of a recent settlement agreement between the Mississippi Public 
Service Commission and Mississippi Power Company, Mississippi Power 
customers will receive ten percent of any royalty revenues from the 
licensing of the Kemper plant gasification technology.283 The Colorado 
PUC has established a similar requirement that utilities submit a plan to 
allocate the intellectual property benefits along with demonstration project 
proposals.284 
Demonstration projects also create benefits by reducing regulatory 
risk for utilities and ratepayers. For example, advanced coal generation 
technologies capture or facilitate capturing CO2 emissions and generally 
have conventional pollutant emissions that are significantly lower than 
traditional pulverized coal plants.285 In the future, these lower emissions 
rates and potentially sequestered CO2 could create benefits for project 
owners if federal emissions standards are tightened or if the cost of 
emissions increases under a cap-and-trade or taxing mechanism. If 
ratepayers are paying the innovation premium, ensuring that ratepayers 
directly benefit from potential upsides should encourage willingness to 
pay and project approval. 
In traditionally regulated electricity markets, utilities typically pass 
the costs—operating and capital—of environmental compliance to 
281. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 66 (describing the consumer benefits of the regulatory compact). 
 282. Tanya Woker, Principles of Copyright in Intellectual Property Law: An Overview, 20 Critical 
Arts: S. N. J. Cultural & Media Stud., no. 1, 2006, at 36. 
283. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Civ. Action 2012-UR-01108, Mississippi Power Company v. 
Mississippi Public Service Commission (Jan. 24, 2013) (settlement agreement). 
 284. Co. Pub. Util. Comm’n, No. 11A-713E 3, Approval of an Innovative Clean Tech. Project 
Consisting of a Solar-to-Battery Demonstration Project at the Solar Tech. Acceleration Ctr. & 
for an Order Authorizing Deferred Accounting of All Project Costs (Oct. 12, 2011).  
285. Michael T. Burr, Battle Royal: Pulverized Coal vs. IGCC, 143 Pub. Util. Fort., Dec. 2005, at 32–35. 
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ratepayers.286 Lower emissions should result in lower compliance costs for 
ratepayers, but ratepayers may not capture all of these benefits depending 
on rate structures and the frequency of rate cases. For example, if 
ratepayers fund an advanced coal plant that sequesters CO2 and the 
corresponding emissions reduction can later be sold, ratepayers who paid 
extra for the project might not see lower rates because traditional 
regulation may not include the sequestration profits in a future rate case. 
PUC rate-setting mechanisms should ensure that ratepayers benefit from 
potential sales of sequestered or reduced emissions in the future. 
2. Aligning the Innovation Premium with the Widespread Benefits
of Innovation
In addition to recognizing and capturing more of the broad consumer 
benefits of technology innovation, sharing the innovation premium more 
widely can alleviate the burden for individual ratepayers and is 
commensurate with the broad social benefits of technological innovation. 
There are multiple options for sharing costs and risks, including strategies 
that could be adopted by utilities, a single state, or groups of states. For 
example, states could help align the innovation premium with the broad 
social benefits of demonstration projects by establishing state funding 
through tax incentives,287 system benefits charges, wire charges, or fees on 
each megawatt hour of coal or fossil generation.288 These measures would 
spread the innovation premium beyond a particular utility’s service area, 
reducing the premium borne by consumers within the implementing 
utility’s service territory. Allocating a portion of the innovation premium 
to the state would mirror the distribution of certain economic development 
benefits—such as by attracting a nascent industry and increased tax 
revenues. 
Notably, this is the rationale for federal incentive programs to 
demonstrate and deploy innovative technologies. However, the examples 
discussed in this Article demonstrate that federal incentives do not offset 
the entire innovation premium, leaving a substantial portion of the 
project’s cost and risk to be borne by ratepayers. State PUCs have come 
down on both sides with regard to projects that have been—or have the 
possibility of being—awarded federal funds to promote innovation. 
While states could provide a source of funding that augments federal 
incentives and is commensurate with the state economic development 
benefits of innovative generation projects, state funds may be difficult to 
 286. See, e.g., Understanding Utility Rates, Ind. Office of the Consumer Council, 
http://www.in.gov/oucc/2389.htm (last visited June 1, 2014). 
 287. See generally Nat'l Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative, Carbon Dioxide Enhanced Oil 
Recovery: A Critical Domestic Energy, Economic, and Environmental Opportunity (2012). 
 288. Dalia Patino Echeverri et al., Res. for the Future, Flexible Mandates for Investment 
in New Technology (2012). 
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establish or insufficient to fully mitigate the innovation premium for 
ratepayers. This Subpart describes two additional measures to further 
distribute the innovation premium: joint ownership of demonstration 
projects and multi-utility long-term contracting requirements. 
3. Joint Ownership
It is not uncommon for utilities to share ownership of large 
generation facilities through bilateral or multilateral agreements. Recent 
examples include nuclear units under construction in South Carolina289 
and Georgia.290 Mississippi Power recently announced a sale of fifteen 
percent of Plant Ratcliffe to South Mississippi Electric Power Association 
(“SMEPA”), which provides electricity to eleven cooperatives in the 
state.291 These ownership arrangements help utilities attain economies of 
scale, spread risk, and reduce the impact on individual ratepayers. 
Sharing ownership more widely and spreading costs across all or 
most of the ratepayers in an individual state or group of states would 
reduce the rate impacts of the innovation premium on a dollar-per-
kilowatt-hour (“$/kWh”) basis. For example, a $1 billion dollar 
demonstration project with $100 million in annual incremental operating 
costs paid for by a utility serving a population of 500,000292 would 
increase electricity prices by almost 3 cents/kWh,293 but sharing these 
costs across a state with a population of 4 million294 would raise electricity 
prices approximately 0.35 cents/kWh. Sharing costs across the top five 
coal states would raise price less than 0.1 cents/kWh. 
 289. South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (“SCE&G”) is jointly developing two new nuclear 
reactors in Jenkinsville, South Carolina. SCE&G will own fifty-five percent of the two units, and 
Santee Cooper, an electric cooperative supply company, will own forty-five percent. In its order 
granting a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (“CPCN”) for the units, the South 
Carolina Public Service commission notes, “the construction of two units allows SCE&G to partner 
with Santee Cooper, spreading risk in the project, and providing a benefit to the state’s electric 
cooperatives and customers.” S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 2008-196-E, Order No. 2009-104(A), In re 
Combined Application of S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. for a Certificate of Envtl. Compatability and Pub. 
Convenience and Necessity and for a Base Load Review Order for the Construction and 
Operation of a Nuclear Facility in Jenkinsville, S.C. 27 (Mar. 2, 2009).  
 290. Georgia Power is constructing two new nuclear units at Plant Vogtle. The company will own 
45.7% of the facility. Oglethorpe Power Corporation (an electric supply cooperative), MEAG Power 
(a consortium of public power systems), and Dalton Utilities (a municipal utility) will own 30%, 
22.7%, and 1.6%, respectively. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 27800-U, Georgia Power’s Application 
for the Certification of Units 3 and 4 at Plant Vogtle and Updated Integrated Resource Plan 
6 (Aug. 1, 2008).  
 291. See SME to Buy Gas-Fired Batesville, Kemper IGCC Power Plant Assets, PennEnergy 
(Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.pennenergy.com/index/power/display/9992743905/articles/pennenergy/ 
power/gas/2012/august/sme-to_buy_gas-fired.html. 
 292. In this illustrative example, we assume the utility serves industrial, commercial, and 
residential customers. Based on per capita electricity sales to all customer classes in West Virginia in 
2011, $1 billion capital costs are incremental capital costs relative to alternative generation options. 
293. Assuming a pre-tax cost of capital of 12.7% and thirty-year amortization. 
294. Same assumptions as above, but for a larger population. 
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Table 2: Rate Impacts of $1 Billion Advanced Coal Demonstration Project 
with $100 Million Incremental Operating Costs.295 
Cost Sharing Entity $/kWh Increase in 2011 West 
Virginia Residential Rate 
Individual utility serving 500,000 residents* $0.027 29% 
Individual state with 4 million residents† $0.003 4% 
Top 5 coal states by percent generation $0.001 1% 
Top 10 coal states by percent generation $0.0004 0.4% 
*Based on per capita electricity use in West Virginia in 2010.
†Assumes all generation consumed locally; no exports. 
Data from EIA Electric Power Monthly 2/2012. 
Utilities are free to form and propose joint demonstration projects 
without state legislative action. Utility commissions cannot require 
utilities to submit joint proposals for demonstration projects that share 
costs across a large customer base, but they can express support for these 
actions during regulatory proceedings or through public comments and 
approve projects that meet their criteria for prudency.296 Utility 
commissioners can also use national (and regional) organizations, such as 
the National Association of Regulated Utility Commissioners, to express 
support for utility cooperation on demonstration projects.297 
Sharing costs across an entire state or multiple states would more 
directly address the concern that benefits accrue more widely than costs, 
but it would likely mean that some of the ratepayers paying for the 
demonstration project would never “use” the generation because it is 
outside of the local market or balancing area. This would represent a 
meaningful change from traditional financing for nonrenewable 
generation. However, Delaware provides a recent example wherein the 
state determined that demonstration project costs should be distributed 
among a distribution utility’s entire customer base—regardless of the 
generation supplier—so that all customers would benefit from the 
project.298 
 295. Sarah K. Adair et al., Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Pol’y Solutions, The State Role in 
Technology Innovation 11 (2013), available at http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/ 
publications/ni_wp_13-01.pdf. 
 296. For example, the Mississippi PSC outlined specific conditions under which it would consider 
Mississippi Power Company’s proposed IGCC project to be in the public interest in an order denying a 
CPCN under the company’s proposed terms. See Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. 2009-UA-14, 
Miss. Power Co. (Apr. 29, 2010). 
 297. The National Association of Regulated Utility Commissioners regularly passes resolutions 
supporting various actions or explaining commissioner perspectives. See generally Resolutions, Nat’l 
Assoc. of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs, http://www.naruc.org/Policy/resolutions.cfm (last visited 
June 1, 2014). 
298. Christopher & Mullooly, supra note 137. 
1390 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1345 
4. Portfolio Standards and Multi-Utility Long-Term Contracting
Requirements
A state or groups of states could establish a portfolio standard for 
innovative energy generation, similar to the advanced coal portfolio 
standard in Illinois.299 This would create a guaranteed market for above-
market generation, with all ratepayers helping to pay for a portion of the 
project cost. If the developer is a vertically integrated utility, its ratepayers 
would pay the majority of the cost unless the price of portfolio credits rose 
significantly because of supply shortfalls. 
Alternatively, multi-utility long-term contracting requirements 
could distribute the innovation premium to more closely match the broad 
social benefits of demonstration projects. This would ensure a market for 
the project developer while spreading the innovation premium across all 
participating utilities (and ratepayers) in contrast to previous proposals—
such as Appalachian Power Company’s proposed IGCC and CCS 
demonstration projects—which would have allocated costs across state 
lines but to ratepayers of a single utility.300 This policy would work 
similarly to Minnesota’s law, which grants Innovative Energy Projects the 
right to a long-term power purchase agreement subject to PUC approval.301 
Instead of establishing the requirement that a single utility enter into a 
power purchase agreement, however, states could require multiple utilities 
to purchase a share of the generation. States and commissions could also 
adopt clear standards for allocating the risk premium between project 
developers and participating utilities. 
Conclusion 
To meet national and global climate mitigation goals, a host of 
innovative low-carbon electricity generation technologies must be 
developed and deployed at a rate that far exceeds the pace of innovation 
and adoption today. The federal government has long supported 
innovation in the energy sector to support economic growth, enhance 
security, and reduce pollution, and technological solutions are a key to 
President Obama’s climate change strategy.302 The President’s 2015 budget 
includes $27.9 billion in discretionary funds for the DOE to “position the 
United States to compete as a world leader in clean energy and advanced 
manufacturing; enhance U.S. energy security; cut carbon pollution and 
respond to and prepare for the threat of climate change; and modernize 
299. Int’l Energy Agency, A Policy Strategy for Carbon Capture and Storage 23 (2012). 
300. See supra Part IV.A.2–3. 
301. See, e.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Budget of the United 
States Government, Fiscal Year 2015 (2014); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the 
President, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2014 (2013).   
302. 2015 Fiscal Year Budget, supra note 301, at 73.  
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the nuclear weapons stockpile and infrastructure.”303 For these strategies 
to succeed, however, project developers must demonstrate to state PUCs 
that utility-scale demonstration projects satisfy their consumer protection 
goals. States, state utility regulators, utilities, and merchant project 
developers need strategies to allocate the costs, risks, and benefits of 
demonstration projects equitably, limiting the cost and risk borne by 
individual ratepayers to finance projects with widespread societal benefits. 
 303. Id. at 7. 
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